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DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS FOR PAIN AND
SUFFERING
Michael D. Moberly*
I. INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")' protects individuals from employment discrimination on a variety of bases, including race,2 color,3 religion,4 sex5 and national origin." As the first compre* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix,
Arizona; Chairman, Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations Board; Editor, The Arizona Labor Letter. This article is dedicated to the memory of Read Carlock.
1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20OOe-17 (1994). The breadth and impact of Title VII can
hardly be overstated. See generally Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 16 (Ct. App.
1996) (observing that "[t]he majority of the laws prohibiting discrimination in employment are set
forth in... Title VII'), superceded on other grounds, 931 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1997), affd, 950 P.2d
567 (Cal. 1998). Indeed, the act has recently been described as "perhaps] the most important legislation of this century." Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. 1:97cv145-C, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6390, at *22 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
593 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 375 (D. Md. 1994)
(characterizing Title VII as "[o]ne of the most important pieces of legislation which prompted the
cause of equal employment opportunity") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,2512).
2. The Supreme Court has indicated that the primary legislative objective underlying Title
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VII was the equalization of employment opportunities and the removal of barriers that had operated "to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971). In this context, "the term 'white citizens' is most often contrasted with 'black citizens'-a racial distinction." Rodriguez v. Gattuso, 795 F. Supp. 860, 865
(N.D. MI1.1992).
3. Title VII cases alleging discrimination on the basis of color are relatively rare, See Felix
v. Marquez, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1132,241, at 22,767 (D.D.C. 1981). However, "in some
situtations the most practicable way to bring one's Title VII... suit may be on the basis of color
discrimination as opposed to race discrimination." Walker v. Secretary of Treasury, 713 F. Supp.
403,407 (N.D. Ga. 1989). As one court has observed:
Most often "race" and "color" discrimination are viewed as synonymous .... But the
very inclusion of "color" as a separate term in addition to "race" in [an antidiscrimination statute] implies strongly that someone who is of the same race.., but who is
treated differently because of his dark skin has been discriminated against because of
his color-something expressly forbidden by [the statute].
Rodriguez, 795 F. Supp. at 865.
4. Title VII not only "forbids religious discrimination by ... employers," but also "requires
them reasonably to accommodate the religious practices of their employees." Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 618 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1),
2000e(j)). Thus, the act places "an affirmative obligation on an employer to attempt to reasonably
accommodate an employee's religious observances or practices." Breech v. Alabama Power Co.,
962 F. Supp. 1447, 1456 (S.D. Ala. 1997). There is no similar obligation in the case of any other
protected Title VII class, see Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir. 1996), although the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994), contain loose analogues in cases involving discrimination against individuals with disabilities, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); 29 C.F.R. §
1614.203(c) (1998); see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 308 n.22 (5th Cir.
1981) ("Outside the handicap discrimination context, the 'reasonable accommodation' issue has
arisen in cases involving persons who claim a right to accommodation of their religious duty to
refrain from working on certain days."). For a scholarly comparison of the reasonable accommodation requirements in these two different contexts, see Alan D. Schuehman, Note, The Holy and
the Handicapped: An Examination of the Different Applications of the ReasonableAccommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA, 73 IND. LJ. 745 (1998).
5. The inclusion of sex as a protected class has an interesting history, and was described by
one court as the product of a "last minute attempt by opponents to block passage" of Title VII. See
Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 297 n.12 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Specifically, sex
was included at the suggestion of the legislation's opponents, who apparently (but mistakenly)
believed that its "wavering supporters" might find the entire act "unpalatable" if it prohibited gender discrimination. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST
EMPLOYMENT DISCIUMINATON LAWS 278 (Havard Univ. Press 1992); cf. Francis J. Vaas, Title
VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 431, 441 (1966) (indicating that the
amendment including sex as a protected Title VII class was offered "in a spirit of satire and ironic
cajolery"). However, this view of sex's inclusion as a protected class has occasionally been disputed. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: PersistentOpportunismas a Maker of
Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 163, 183 (1991) (concluding that "[a]lthough the prohibition of
sex discrimination in employment became law in a manner atypical of major legislation, it was not
as thoughtless, or as devious, as has previously been assumed").
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Supreme Court has observed that "[ihe term 'national
origin' ... refers to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from
which his or her ancestors came." Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973). In this regard, national origin discrimination may be closely related to discrimination on the basis of color.
See Walker, 713 F. Supp. at 406 (observing that "[a] person's color is closely tied to his ancestry,"
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hensive federal employment discrimination legislation
Title VII heralded a "revolutionary change" in the legal
in the general nature of the employment relationship. 9
As originally enacted and enforced for more than
century, 0 Title VII attempted to eliminate workplace

ever enacted,7
landscape' and
a quarter of a
discrimination

through reinstatement provisions," back pay, front pay, 3 prejudgment
or race); see, e.g., Bullard v. OMI Ga., Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981); Spiess v. C. Itoh &
Co., 408 F. Supp. 916, 928 n.17 (S.D. Tex. 1976). See generally Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bottling
Group, 526 F. Supp. 1268, 1270 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Certainly it is not at all clear that the discrimination suffered by persons from particular countries.., results from their national origin rather
than the circumstance that they are usually not Caucasions."). In some cases, national origin discrimination could also be reflective of religious discrimination. See, e.g., Fraser v. New York City
Bd. of Educ., No. 96 Civ. 0625 (SHS), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1338, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9,
1998) (observing that plaintiff's contention that he was "discriminated against because he was a
Hebrew Israelite... arguably raised the specter that he had been discriminated against because of
his national origin, religion or color"). But see Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div.,
494 F. Supp. 215, 216 (W.D. La. 1980) (asserting that "a person's national origin has nothing to do
with color, religion, or race").
7. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545 (1974); Piva v. Xerox Corp., 376 F. Supp.
242, 246 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Smith v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 50 F.R.D. 515, 518 (N.D. Okla.
1970); see also Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 82 F.R.D. 420, 429 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(describing the Civil Rights Act of which Title VII is a part as the "first comprehensive legislation
ever to address the pervasive problem of discrimination against minorities").
8. See McIntosh v. Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 767 F.2d 433, 437 (8th Cir. 1985); see also
Smith, 50 F.R.D. at 519-20 (describing Title VII as "novel" legislation that "represented a new
Federal prohibition [that] for the first time outlaw[ed] discrimination in private employment as a
matter of Federal law").
9. One court has observed that "[p]rior to the enactment of Title VIL employers openly discriminated against individuals based on negative stereotypes regarding, inter alia, gender and
race." Hiatt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1432 n.16 (D. Wyo. 1994). However, "in
most instances Title VII has eliminated the more obvious and explicit forms of discrimination .. " Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 146 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1979); cf. Hicks v.
Brown Group, Inc., 982 F.2d 295, 302 n.10 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Since Title VII was enacted, employers have been on continual notice that discriminatory practices are subject to lawsuits.") (citation
omitted) (quotations omitted).
10. For a general discussion of Title VII's application and enforcement during this period,
see David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121 (1989).
11. "Reinstatement is such a basic element of Title VII relief that granting such relief is presumed appropriate and, except in extraordinary cases, is required." Davis v. Kansas City Hous.
Auth., 822 F. Supp. 609, 617 (W.D. Mo. 1993); see also Hartman v. Duffey, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6
(D.D.C. 1998) (describing reinstatement as "an important remedy under Title VII'). Indeed, one
court has observed (at a time when neither compensatory nor punitive damages was yet available)
that any other Title VII relief "is incidental to ... the equitable remedy of reinstatement." Mitchell
v. Alex Foods, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 825, 826 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
12. Back pay is "designed to compensate a victim of unlawful discrimination for the economic injuries of discrimination" and thus is also "an integral part of Title VII." Brunetti v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1363, 1377 (E.D. Ark. 1981). The amount of back pay awarded to a
successful Title VII claimant is typically "the difference between his actual earnings and what he
would have earned absent the discrimination of the defendant." Id. Because back pay reflects
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interest,14 and other equitable remedies. 5 However, legal remedies such
as punitive and compensatory damages (including damages for the victim's pain and suffering) 6 were generally unavailable under the act. 7
Addressing an omission in Title VII, s and effectively continuing
monetary compensation, it would "ordinarily be categorized as a legal remedy." Taylor v. Rhode
Island, 736 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.R.I. 1990). In Title VII cases, however, it is "part of the equitable
remedy of reinstatement." Grayson v. Wickes Corp., 607 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th Cir. 1979). Thus,
the courts have "almost universally defined back pay under Title VII as equitable relief." Taylor,
736 F. Supp. at 17.
13. While reinstatement is the "preferred" remedy for Title VII violations, "it may not always be an appropriate one." Webb v. District of Columbia, 146 F.3d 964, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Where it is not, the alternative equitable remedy of front pay, reflecting "the discounted present
value of the difference between the earnings [an employee] would have received in his old employment and the earnings he can be expected to receive in his present and future, and by hypothesis inferior, employment," may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. Williams v. Pharmacia,
Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 1998) (first alteration in original) (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
14. The Supreme Court has observed: "[Aipparently all the United States Courts of Appeals
that have considered the question agree, that Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest as part of

the backpay remedy in suits against private employers. This conclusion surely is correct." Loeffler
v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557-58 (1988) (footnote omitted).

15. The Act's principal remedial provision states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally en-

gaging in an unlawful employment practice... the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay... or any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994). See generally In re Webb, 210 B.R. 266, 273 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1997) ("Prior to 1991, the primary relief available to a plaintiff in a Title VII intentional discrimination action was equitable in nature .... ) (footnote omitted).
16. See Robinson v. City of Lake Station, 630 F. Supp. 1052, 1064 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
("Damages for 'pain and suffering' are compensatory and thus are not recoverable under Title
VII."); Flynn v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 679 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
("[C]ompensatory damages for pain and suffering have not been allowed under Title VII."); J.
LeVonne Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII at Twenty: The Continuing Challenge, 1 LAB.
LAW. 235, 255 (1985) (observing that there was "no monetary remedy for the pain, suffering, and
humiliation of... discrimination" under Title VII as originally enacted).
17. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 238 (1992) ("Title VII does not allow awards
for compensatory or punitive damages; instead, it limits available remedies to backpay, injunctions, and other equitable relief."). For one of many arguments that Title VII's original remedial
scheme was inadequate to fulfill the statutory objectives, see Michael W. Roskiewicz, Note, Title
VII Remedies: Lifting the Statutory Caps from the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal
Remedies for Employment Discrimination,43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 391, 392-401
(1993).
18. See Ynclan v. Department of Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1390 n.1 (5th Cir. 1991)
(observing that 'Title VII does not... prohibit dismissal due to handicap"); Learned v. City of
Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1988) (indicating that "discrimination based upon physical
and mental limitations" is not prohibited by Title VII; Evans v. Trowbridge, 60 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 324, 325 (E.D. La. 1992) ('The plain language of Title VII clearly provides no cause
of action for discrimination on the basis of handicap."); Merrifield v. Beaven/nter-Am. Cos,, 3
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the civil rights revolution that prompted its enactment, 9 the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 20 prohibits discrimination in
employment2' on the basis of an individual's disability.' Prior to the
ADA's enactment, Congress had repeatedly declined to amend Title VII
to prohibit such discrimination.' The federal disability discrimination
legislation that did exist 4 had proven to be largely ineffective.5 There1991) (noting that the contention that an
Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1584, 1586 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
employee was terminated due to a perceived disability "is not a basis for a Title VII action"); DeSapio v. Josephthal & Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 932, 937 (Sup. Ct. 1989) ("Title VII does not prohibit
disability-based discrimination.")
19. See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 771 (E.D. Tex. 1996)
(describing the Americans with Disabilities Act as "norm-changing legislation,akin to the legislative turning points in this country's struggle to overcome racial discrimination"); Karen M. Doore,
Note, Survival of the Fittest? Waiting Out the Death of the Plaintiffin ADA Claims: Mired v. Solaray, Inc., 1998 UTAH L. REV. 371, 390 n.153 ("It is certainly not controversial to say that the
ADA is a civil rights statute."); cf Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888,
921 (1st Cir. 1988) (Bownes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing Title VII
as a product of "the civil rights revolution of the 1960s").
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). For comprehensive judicial discussions of the ADA's
legislative origins, see Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 329-31 (3d Cir. 1995) and Valentine v.
American Home Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1376, 1388-91 (N.D. Iowa 1996). For the author's
own previous consideration of the ADA, see Michael D. Moberly, Perception or Reality?: Some
Reflections on the Interpretationof DisabilityDiscriminationStatutes, 13 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 345
(1996).
21. "Among other things, the ADA protects millions of disabled Americans from discrimination in employment." EEOC v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1098 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Moore, J., dissenting). However, the ADA's prohibition of disability discrimination extends well
beyond the employment context. See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538,
541 (7th Cir. 1995). The Act also prohibits such discrimination in connection with access to public
accommodations, in the provision of public services and public transportation, and in telecommunications. See Doe v. Kohn Nast & Graf, P.C., 862 F. Supp. 1310, 1321 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (public
accommodations and public services); Trautz v. Weisman, 819 F. Supp. 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(public services); Kinney v. Yerusalim, 812 F. Supp. 547, 548-50 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (public transportation and communications). Indeed, one court has remarked that "as a general civil rights statute,
the ADA involves every area of law." Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 430 (5th
Cir. 1997).
22. In particular, the ADA prohibits disability discrimination "in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
See generallyAnderson, 924 F. Supp. at 771 (observing that the ADA "bars discrimination against
the disabled in all aspects of employment").
23. See Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1995) ("Periodically through
the mid-1980s there [were] attempts to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include people with
disabilities."); DeSapio, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 937 ("While bills have been proposed to amend Title VII
to cover handicapped individuals.., such legislation has not been enacted ....) (citation omitted). For an academic discussion of this issue, see Stephen D. Erf, Note, Potluck Protectionsfor
HandicappedDiscriminatees:The Need to Amend Title VII to ProhibitDiscriminationon the Basis of Disability, 8 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 814 (1977).
24. "The ADA was not the first attempt... to eradicate discrimination on the basis of disabilities." Valentine, 939 F. Supp. at 1389; see also Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

5

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal
[Vol. 17:1

fore, the ADA represents a "revolution" in the field of rights for dis-

abled persons.6
Somewhat surprisingly, the ADA contains no specific remedial
provisions of its own.' Instead, it incorporates Title VII's remedial
scheme,n despite the widely held view that disability discrimination

statutes patterned after other civil rights laws may be ineffective.29 Thus,
as under Title VII, ° one could not recover either compensatory nor punitive damages under the ADA as originally enacted.3 This limitation

482, 486 (W.D. Ark. 1994) ("[The ADA] is, of course, not this country's first experience with attempting to legislate to aid handicapped individuals or individuals with a disability."), vacated, 60
F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995), rev'don other grounds, 98 F.3d 396 (8th Cir. 1996). For a list of federal
disability discrimination legislation predating the ADA, see Anderson, 924 F. Supp. at 771 n.1 1.
25. See Helen L, 46 F.3d at 331 (discussing the "shortcomings and deficiencies" of federal
disability discrimination legislation prior to the ADA); Valentine, 939 F. Supp. at 1388 (discussing
the "perceived inadequacies" of pre-ADA disability discrimination laws).
26. See Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 294; see also Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Trautz, 819 F. Supp. at 294); cf.
Doore, supra note 19, at 372 (noting that the ADA has been "widely hailed as landmark litigation"). Like Title VII, the ADA is undoubtedly "one of the most important civil rights statutes
passed this century." Prevo's Family Mkt., 135 F.3d at 1098 (Moore, J., dissenting); see also
Doore, supra note 19, at 372 (describing the ADA as the "most significant labor and employment
law in recent history"); Ward v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 861 F. Supp. 367, 375 (D. Md. 1994)
(characterizing Title VII as "[o]ne of the most important pieces of legislation which prompted the
cause of equal employment opportunity") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 554, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,2512).
27. Congress elected not to adopt a remedial scheme unique to the ADA despite widespread
concerns that disability discrimination claims "are different from other types of discrimination
claims," Bates v. Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1035 (2d Cir. 1993), and that the remedies
necessary to rectify such discrimination therefore may "differ in important ways from [those appropriate for] other types of discrimination," Fink, 881 F. Supp. at 1368 (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 48, 149 (1983)).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994); see also Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d
196, 200 (5th Cir. 1996) ("The remedies provided under the ADA are the same as those provided
by Title VII .. ")(citations omitted); Olds v. Alamo Group (KS), Inc., 889 F. Supp. 447, 449 (D.
Kan. 1995) ("Mhe ADA incorporates the remedies and procedures of Title VII."); Houck v. City
of Prairie Village, 912 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Kan. 1996) (indicating that the ADA "has incorporated by reference certain powers, remedies and procedures of Title VII').
29. See Valentine, 939 F. Supp. at 1389; cf.Garrity v. Gallen, 522F. Supp. 171,206 (D.N.H.
1981) ("[A]ttempting to fit the problem of discrimination against the handicapped into the model
remedy for race discrimination is akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole ....). For an academic discussion of this issue, see Cornelius J. Peck, Employment Problems of the Handicapped:
Would Title VII Remedies Be Appropriateand Effective?, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 343 (1982).
30. See supranotes 16-17 and accompanying text.
31. See Outlaw v. City of Dothan, 3 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 939, 943 (M.D. Ala. 1993)
(noting that "[p]unitive damages were not recoverable under any provision of... the ADA" until
1991); Antol v. Perry, 4 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 441, 443 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (noting the contention that compensatory damages were unavailable in disability discrimination cases that arose
prior to 1991), rev'd in part and affid in part on other grounds, 82 F.3d 1291 (3d Cir. 1996). See
generally Buchanan, 85 F.3d at 200 (observing that in 1991 Congress "expanded the type of dam-
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ultimately proved to be of no practical significance in disability discrimination cases. 32
Rectifying another omission in Title VII, 3 a third major federal
employment discrimination act, 4 the Age Discrimination in Employ-

ment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), 35 prohibits employers from discriminating
against persons forty years of age or over.36 Although Congress specifically declined to address the problem of age discrimination when it en-

ages which may be recovered under... the ADA to include punitive and general compensatory
damages").
32. As discussed infra notes 56-67, the limitation was eliminated by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), which became effective on November 21, 1991.
See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 237 n.8 (1992). Although the ADA was enacted in 1990,
"its provisions relating to employment discrimination did not take effect until July 26, 1992." Raya
v. Maryatt Indus., 829 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 1993). Because the ADA does not apply
retroactively, see O'Bryant v. City of Midland, 9 F.3d 421, 422 (5th Cir. 1993), there actually have
been no employment discrimination cases cognizable under the ADA to which the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 did not apply, see EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1995) (noting that "the ADA became effective after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 went into
effect").
33. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 654 n.2 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (referring to
the "gap left by Title VII, which did not address age discrimination"); A-Hashimi v. Scott, 756 F.
Supp. 1567, 1569 n.2 (S.D. Ga. 1991) (noting that "Title VII does not prohibit age discrimination"); Davis v. KGO-T.V., Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 13, 16 (Ct. App. 1996) ("Age discrimination...
is not a Title VII violation."), superceded on other grounds, 931 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1997), aff'd, 950
P.2d 567 (Cal. 1998).
34. See Robert Cavallaro, Note, CorporateBuyer Beware: Deficiencies in Directors' and
Officers' Insurancefor Employment Practices Liability, 26 HoFSTRA L. REV. 217, 226 (1997)
(describing Title VII, the ADA and the ADEA as "the three federal anti-discrimination statutes").
There are, of course, other less-encompassing federal employment discrimination statutes, the most
notable of which may be the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994). Like
the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits disability discrimination in employment, but unlike the
ADA (which extends to private as well as public employers), it applies "only to the federal government, government contractors, and recipients of federal assistance." Raya, 829 F. Supp. at
1174. Despite its more limited coverage, the survival issues discussed in this article obviously can
arise under the Rehabilitation Act as well. See, e.g., Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39 (D. Mass.
1990).
35. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. 1 1994). The ADEA has been characterized as
the "first federal statute which had as its purpose a prevention of discrimination in employment on
account of age." Platt v. Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see also Kenney v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1504, 1506 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ('The ADEA represents a
comprehensive congressional scheme designed to prohibit and remedy employment discrimination
based on age.").
36. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (1994). As originally enacted, the ADEA only protected
persons between the ages of forty and sixty-five. See Crozier v. Howard, 11 F.3d 967, 969 (10th
Cir. 1993). The upper age limit for the ADEA's protected class was extended to seventy in 1978,
and eliminated entirely in 1986. Id.; see also Goodman v. Heitman Fin. Servs., 894 F. Supp. 1166,
1170 (N.D. 111.1995) ("While the statute originally limited such protection to workers between the
ages of 40 and 65, a series of amendments uncapped the ADEA so that there is now no bright-line
upper age limit .... ") (citation omitted).
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acted Title V,
the ADEA is unquestionably a product of the same
civil rights revolution" that prompted Title VII's enactment.39
Like the ADA,' the ADEA contains no specific remedial provi-

sions for the enforcement of its prohibitions. 4 Unlike the ADA, 42 the
ADEA is not enforced through the adoption of Title V's remedial

scheme, 43 but instead through the selective incorporation of various Fair
Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")4 provisions. 5
37. See Lavery v. Marsh, 727 F. Supp. 728,729 (D.Mass. 1989):
During the 1964 floor debate over the bill that was to become Title VII, both the House
of Representatives and the Senate considered amendments to the bill that would have
barred employment discrimination on the basis of age as well as on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin. The amendments with regard to agediscrimination were ultimately rejected, in part because Congress did not yet have
enough information to make a considered judgment about the nature of agediscrimination.
Id.; see also EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1072, 1073 (E.D. Okla.
1988) ("When Title VII was in the developmental stages, Congress considered amendments which
would have banned age discrimination along with the other basis [sic] of discrimination which
were eventually included within Title VII. The legislation which was finally enacted as Title VII
did not, however, include age based discrimination ....
") (citation omitted), rev'd on other
grounds, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989).
38. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. But cf. Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d
1190, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (observing that the ADEA "is not a civil rights act").
39. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,231 (1983) (describing the ADEA as the "product
of [a] process... formally begun in 1964," when Title VII was enacted); Lavery, 727 F. Supp. at
729 ("The ADEA... had its origins in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."); cf. Westfall v.
City of Cohoes, 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 964, 967 n.6 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (observing that
"Title VII and the ADEA were enacted with the same remedial goal in mind"), vacated on other
grounds,No. 86-CV-817, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6925 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 1988).
40. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
41. See Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1317 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982) ("The
ADEA's proscription against age discrimination is (not] enforced... through independent ADEA
remedies."). However, one provision of the ADEA authorizes "such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994).
42. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
43. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-85 (1978) (indicating that Congress "rejected"
adoption of the Title VII remedial scheme "even while adopting Title VII's substantive prohibitions"); Morelock v. NCR Corp., 546 F.2d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 1976) ("Although the prohibitory
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are in terms identical, the enforcement sections of these acts
differ."), vacated on other grounds,435 U.S. 911 (1978).
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994 & Supp. 1 1995). Congress passed the FLSA to protect
workers from substandard wages by requiring the payment of a uniform minimum wage and additional compensation for overtime work to most individuals employed in interstate commerce. See
id.§§ 206-207. See generally Stewart v. Region II Child & Family Servs., 788 P.2d 913, 917
(Mont. 1990) (observing that Congress passed the FLSA to "ensure a minimum living standard"
for workers); Elkins v. Showcase, Inc., 704 P.2d 977, 987 (Kan. 1985) ("The expressed congressional purpose in passing the FLSA was to enable a substantial part of the American work force to
maintain a minimum standard of living."). For the author's previous discussions of the FLSA, see
Michael D. Moberly, FairLabor Standards Act Preemption of "Public Policy" Wrongfid DischargeClaims, 42 DRAKE L. REv. 525 (1993), and Michael D. Moberly, FairLaborStandardsAct
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For example, when the ADEA has been violated, the FLSA provides for the recovery of unpaid wages" and, if the employer's discrimi-

natory conduct was willful,47 an additional, equal amount of liquidated49
damages. 4 Other remedies not specifically authorized by the FLSA,

such as front pay" and prejudgment interest,"' also may be available in

Preemption of State Wage PaymentRemedies, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 991 (1991).
45. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides for the enforcement of that Act in accordance with
the powers, remedies and procedures provided for in the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994); see
also Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[The ADEA] is enforced through express incorporation of the remedial rights and procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act...."); Morelock, 546 F.2d at 687 ("The enforcement provisions of... the ADEA essentially follow those of the Fair Labor Standards Act .... ). See generally Slatin v. Stanford
Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1295 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Congress rejected other avenues of enforcement in favor of selective adoption of FLSA enforcement provisions."). But see Gilchrist v. Jim
Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676 (9th
Cir. 1997).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Damages under the ADEA "are deemed to be the 'unpaid minimum wages' or 'unpaid overtime compenstation' referred to in § 216(b) of the FLSA." Fariss v.
Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 964 n.7 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc., 674 F. Supp. 1432, 1440 (D. Kan. 1987) ("Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of [the ADEA are] deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compenstation
for purposes of... the Fair Labor Standards Act .... ) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)).
47. An employer's conduct is considered willful for purposes of the ADEA if it either knew
or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct was prohibited. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 614-17 (1993). For a recent academic consideration of the potential implications of this standard, see Jan W. Henkel, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act: Disparate
Impact Analysis and the Availability of Liquidated DamagesAfter Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 47
SYRACUSEL. REv. 1183 (1997).
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), 626(b) (1994). The characterization of these additional damages as "liquidated" has been described as a "misnomer," on the ground that they are more akin to
punitive damages. See Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 797 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., dissenting); see also Kelly, 640 F.2d at 979 ("Mhe award of liquidated damages is in effect a substitution for punitive damages and is intended to deter intentional violations of the ADEA.").
49. The FLSA is silent with respect to whether either front pay or prejudgment interest can
be recovered in cases arising under that Act. See Moskowitz v. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 5 F.3d
279, 283 (7th Cir. 1993) (characterizing front pay as a judicial "invention"); McClanahan v.
Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 324 (6th Cir. 1971) ("The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 makes no
provision for interest on amounts recovered as restitution of unpaid back wages .... ); cf. Avitia
v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1995) ('We cannot find any
case in which front pay has been awarded under the Fair Labor Standards Act .... ).
50. See McNeil v. Economics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 118 (7th Cir. 1986) ("All of the circuits that have decided the issue.., have held that front pay is an available remedy in appropriate
cases brought under the ADEA."), rev'd on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860
F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988).
51. However, "[t]he circuit courts are split as to whether an award of prejudgment interest is
proper when a court awards liquidated damages to plaintiffs in ADEA suits." Bums v. Texas City
Refining, Inc., 890 F.2d 747, 752 (5th Cir. 1989). For the author's previous consideration of this
issue, see Michael D. Moberly, The Recoverability of Prejudgment Interest Under the ADEA After
Thurston, 8 LAB. LAW. 225 (1992).
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ADEA cases. z However, as under Title VII and the ADA as originally
enacted,53 neither compensatory nor punitive damages are recoverable
under the FLSA 4 or the ADEA.55

Effecting yet another landmark change in employment discrimination law,56 Congress eventually broadened the remedies available under
Title VII and the ADA, but not those available under the ADEA,5 ' by

enacting the Civil Rights Act of 199l." As originally introduced in
1990,"9 the primary purpose of this act was to negate the impact of sev-

52. The ADEA's provision for appropriate "legal or equitable relief' (see supra note 41 and
accompanying text) does not appear in the FLSA. See Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
810 F.2d 1094, 1101 (llth Cir. 1987).
53. See supranotes 16-17, 30-32 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 1982)
("[D]amages for pain and suffering have never been awarded under the FLSA."); Eggleston v.
South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 858 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (observing that
"compensatory damages are not recoverable under the FLSA"); Skrove v. Heiraas, 303 N.W,2d
526, 531-32 (N.D. 1981) (holding that punitive damages are unavailable under the FLSA); King v.
J.C. Penney Co., 58 F.R.D. 649, 650 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ("The F.L.S.A. itself does not provide for
the recovery of punitive damages, and this court is unaware of any judicial decision allowing punitive damages to be recovered.").
55. See, e.g., Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966 (10th Cir. 1987) ("[A]II...
circuits that have [addressed the issue] deny punitive damages in ADEA cases."); Bailey v. Container Corp. of Am., 594 F. Supp. 629, 633 (S.D. Ohio 1984) ("[N]either compensatory nor punitive damages are available under the ADEA.").
56. See Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting
Congressional Record); see also Brown v. Amoco Oil Co., 793 F. Supp. 846, 850 (N.D. Ind. 1992)
(observing that the 1991 Act "works a radical change in the consequences of a Title VII violation").
57. See Lee v. Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 921, 930 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("We note that the 1991 Act
does not authorize compensatory damages for age discrimination."); Morgan v. Servicemaster Co.,
57 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1423, 1424 (N.D. Il. 1992) (observing that "age" is not one of the
types of discrimination the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was intended to "clarify"). Congress' failure
to address age discrimination when it expanded the remedies available to other victims of employment discrimination has been criticized. See, e.g., Howard Eglit, The Age Discriminationin
Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn't
Bark, 39 WAYNEL. REV. 1093, 1206 n.365 (1993).
58. Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The passage of the Act was the culmination
of an extended, and at times bitter, legislative struggle over civil rights reform. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir. 1992); Joyner v. Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F.
Supp. 872, 876 (S.D. Fla. 1992). For the author's previous discussion of the Act, see Michael D.
Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The Impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKLA. Crry U. L. REV. 475 (1993).
59. See Butts v. City of New YorkfDep't of Hous. Preservation & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1405
(2d Cir. 1993) ("In 1990, Congress presented President Bush with a civil rights bill, containing the
same proscription against discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment as the 1991
version ....
").
For an academic discussion of the unenacted 1990 legislation, see Cynthia L. Alexander, Special Project, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading through the Rhetoric
in Search of Compromise in Civil Rights in the Workplace of the 1990s, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595
(1991).
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eral recent Supreme Court decisions that had undermined existing employment discrimination laws,' including Title VII.6' As ultimately en-

acted,62 however, the 1991 act went well beyond a restoration of prior
law63 and, among other things, authorized the recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages 64 that had never previously been available in federal employment discrimination cases.' Because the expanded remedies

60. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
61. See Browning v. AT&T Paradyne, 120 F.3d 222, 224 (11th Cir. 1997) (observing that
Congress "was expressly seeking to overturn several Supreme Court decisions limiting the remedies available to victims of discrimination"); Canada v. Boyd Group, 809 F. Supp. 771,779-80 (D.
Nev. 1992) ("Congress' purpose in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to strengthen the
scope of federal civil rights protection that had been weakened by recent United States Supreme
Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1306 ("Congress' clear intention was to undo the
Court decisions .. ");
effects of these cases, which it believed were wrongly decided, and to restore civil rights law to its
previous state.").
62. The 1990 bill passed Congress, but was vetoed by President Bush, primarily because it
contained a retroactivity provision. See Mass v. Martin Marietta Corp., 805 F. Supp. 1530, 1536
(D. Colo. 1992); Autrey v. Potlatch Corp., 800 F. Supp. 872, 874 (N.D. Cal. 1992). After much
litigation over the issue, see Wright v. ICI Americas Inc., 813 F. Supp. 1083, 1094 (D. Del. 1993)
(referring to the "highly litigated question of whether the 1991 Civil Rights Act is to apply retroactively"), the Supreme Court ultimately held that the 1991 Act did not apply retroactively, see
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298
(1994).
63. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998) ("While
the Act was primarily designed to 'overrule' hostile Supreme Court decisions in order to make
discrimination claims easier both to bring and to prove in federal courts.... it increased substantially the procedural rights and remedies available to Title VII plaintiffs in federal courts ....);
Butts, 990 F.2d at 1407 ("Congress deliberately deleted all 'restore' language in drafting the 1991
version."); Canada, 809 F. Supp. at 780 (indicating that the purpose of the 1991 Act was to
"restore and expand the rights of discrimination victims") (emphasis added); Reynolds v. Frank,
786 F. Supp. 168, 170 (D. Conn. 1992) (observing that the expansive purpose of the 1991 Act
"contrasts [with] the language used in the 1990 Act, the stated purpose of which is 'restoring...
civil rights protections"') (quoting 1990 bill); David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. L.J. 849, 850 (1992) (asserting that the 1991 act "reaches beyond a
simple 'restoration' of prior laws").
64. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a), (b) (1994); United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 241 n.12
(1992); Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215-16 (6th Cir. 1996); Presutti v. Felton Brush, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 545, 550 (D.N.H. 1995): Meadows v. Guptill, 856 F. Supp. 1362,
1371 (D. Ariz. 1993); Canada,809 F. Supp. at 779.
65. See Burke, 504 U.S. at 239 ("Nothing in [the original] remedial scheme purport[ed] to
recompense a Title VII plaintiff for any of the... traditional harms associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential
");
Williams v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 905 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1990)
damages ....
(observing that "emotional and punitive damages [were] not available under Title VII" as originally enacted); Taylor v. Central Pa. Drug & Alcohol Servs. Corp., 890 F. Supp. 360, 373 (M.D.
Pa. 1995) ("[Compensatory] damages are not availabe to plaintiffs under Title VII, [where] their
claims arose prior to the ...effective date of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.").
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provided for in the 1991 act do not extend to ADEA cases, 6 however,

compensatory and punitive damages continue to be unavailable under
that act.67

As is typical in conventional state law tort actions,6 the remedies
now available in Title VII and ADA cases include damages for the
plaintiff's pain and suffering.6 The basic purpose of such an award is to

compensate discrimination victims for the "physiological and psychological damages caused by the employer's unlawful conduct,"7' although

such an71award may simultaneously serve an important deterrent function
as well.

66. See Gordon v. Pall Aeropower Corp., No. 97-1749-CIV-T-25(B), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18602, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 1998) (observing that "the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not
alter the nature of the relief available to an ADEA plaintiff'); Rossi v. Sun Ref. & Mktg. Corp.,
No. 94-3037, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225, at *35 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 1995) (noting that "the remedies provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ...has not been extended to cover ADEA claims").
67. In Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), for example, the court cited
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in observing that "unlike the ADEA, Title VII now permits the recovery of both compensatory and punitive damages." Id. at 1241; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text. But cf. Bender v. Salvation Army, 830 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (M.D. Fla. 1993) ("The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act... as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, permit[s]
the recoupment of compensatory and punitive damages.") (emphasis added); Caraballo v. South
Stevedoring, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1462, 1465 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (adopting the position taken in
Bender).
68. See Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prods. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474,484 (Ohio 1992) ("One of
the elements of compensatory damages that is universally allowed in actions for personal injuries
is the pain and suffering endured by the plaintiff as a result of the injury."); see also Myers v.
Rollette, 439 P.2d 497, 502 (Ariz. 1968) (en banc) ("It is well established that pain and suffering
are proper elements to consider in awarding damages in a negligence action for personal injuries."); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 11., 507 F. Supp. 21, 24-25 (N.D. Ill.
1980)
(observing that "damages recoverable in a products liability action include conscious pain and suffering resulting from bodily injury").
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (1995); Canada,809 F. Supp. at 779; In re Webb, 210 B.R.
266, 273 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); cf. McIntosh v. Irving Trust Co., 873 F. Supp. 872, 881 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[C]ompensatory damages for pain and suffering are not recoverable under Title
VII as it existedpriorto the 1991 amendments.") (emphasis added).
70. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.N.J. 1975) (age discrimination case), vacated and remanded, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 689 P.2d 1292, 1303 (Or. 1984) (en banc) (indicating that legal remedies under Title
VII would "compensat[e] the plaintiff for such personal injuries as anguish, physical symptoms of
stress, a sense of degradation, and the cost of psychiatric care").
71. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 250 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("mhe
purpose of [Title VII] liability is... to compensate employees for injury they suffer and to
'eradicate discrimination thoughout the economy."') (citation omitted). See generally Memphis
Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) ("Deterrence... operates through the
mechanism of damages that are compensatory-damagesgrounded in determinations of plaintiffs'
actual losses."); Goad v. Macon County, Tenn., 730 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) ("The
basic concept of compensatory damages serving as a deterrent to unlawful conduct as well as a
compensation for the injuries is that the threat of compensating for the injuries will make the actor
less inclined to perform the conduct.").
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At common law, personal injury claims-of which employment

discrimination claims may be considered examples 72-did not survive
the death of the injured party.73 The precise origins of this doctrine (the
74
Latin appellation of which is actio personalis moritur cum persona)
are unclear.75 However, it appears to have been based at least in part
upon the fact that acts now characterized as torts were originally treated
as crimes.76 As a result, any damage recovery was premised upon a theory of vengeance,' and the concept of "compensating" for the victim's
injuries was virtually unknown.78 Under that theory, once the victim
72. See Soignier v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1996)
(observing that an ADA claim "is best characterized as one for personal injury"), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1093 (1997); Hickey v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[C]laims
for discrimination are essentially claims for personal injury."); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 882 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 (D.N.H. 1995) (concluding that "a claim for discrimination brought
under the ADA is best characterized as a claim for personal injury"); Lipka v. Minnesota Sch.
Employees Ass'n, Local 1980, 537 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("Title VII actions are
personal injury claims.").
73. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973); McLellan v. Automobile Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 344, 348 (9th Cir. 1935); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 92
(Idaho 1990); Estate of Burron v. Edwards, 594 P.2d 1064, 1065 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Harrington v. Flanders, 407 P.2d 946,947 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965).
74. In English, the phrase translates to "a personal right of action dies with the person."
Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., 477 P.2d 511, 512 (Idaho 1970); see also Sullivan v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 935 P.2d 781, 784 (Cal. 1997). For scholarly discussions of the common law doctrine's origins, see Florence Frances Cameron, Note, Defamation Survivability and the Demise of
the Antiquated "Actio Personalis" Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834-35 (1985); Luke
DeGrand, Note, Challenging the Exclusion of Libel and Slanderfrom Survival Statutes, 1984 U.
ILL. L. REV. 423, 426.
75. See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342,344 (1937); Parkerson v. Carrouth,
782 F.2d 1449, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986); Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 396 N.E.2d 987,
990 (Mass. 1979); Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 442 (Pa. 1975); Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado
Nat'l Bank, 338 P.2d 702, 707 (Colo. 1959) (en banc). One court has noted that "[a]t one time,
commentators thought the maxim originated in Roman jurisprudence, but this assumption has
since been abandoned." In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 625,
630 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
76. See Van Beeck, 300 U.S. at 345; Parkerson, 782 F.2d at 1451; Canino v. New York
News, Inc., 475 A.2d 528, 529-30 (N.J. 1984); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400,
402 (Minn. 1982); Harrison, 396 N.E.2d at 990; Moyer, 341 A.2d at 442; Publix Cab Co., 338
P.2d at 707; Cooper v. Runnels, 291 P.2d 657, 658-59 (Wash. 1955).
77. See Inflight Explosion, 778 F. Supp. at 630; Canino, 475 A.2d at 529; Harrison,396
N.E.2d at 990; Gustafson v. Rajkovich, 263 P.2d 540, 546 (Ariz. 1953) (Phelps, J., dissenting).
78. See Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 403; see also Wiggins v. Lane & Co., 298 F. Supp. 194,
195 (E.D. La. 1969) ("The common law doctrine stemmed from the rule adopted by English courts
that 'in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury.'")
(citation omitted); Gustafson, 263 P.2d at 546 (Phelps, J., dissenting) ("The common-law
maxim... was rooted in the concept that the wrong to which the maxim applied was criminal in
nature and that any recovery in damages was upon the theory of vengeance against the wrongdoer,
not compensation of the injured person commensurate with the injury sustained."); cf. Nappe v.
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died, his need for vengeance (and therefore any right to recover damages) was also deemed to have expired.79
As the conceptual underpinnings of tort law shifted from vengeance to compensation,"0 the common law rule became the subject of increasing criticism." As a result, virtually all states have now enacted
statutes,8 commonly known as survival statutes, 3 abrogating the actio
personalis doctrine 4 and allowing tort actions to continue upon the
death of the victim."
Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1238 (N.J. 1984) (O'Hern, J.,
concurring)
("At early common law... there was no measure of damages.").
79. See Inflight Explosion, 778 F. Supp. at 630; Harrison, 396 N.E.2d at 990; see also Canino, 475 A.2d at 529 ("Since the recovery of damages was viewed as a matter of personal revenge
between the victim and [the] wrongdoer, death erased the purpose of a civil action between
them ....
").
80. See Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 405 (observing that "medieval notions of revenge.., no
longer have a place in our law[,] since compensation rather than punishment is now the essential
purpose of any tort cause of action").
81. See, e.g., Canino, 475 A.2d at 529 (asserting that the rule has "no foundation in principle"); Moyer, 341 A.2d at 442 (noting previous characterization of the rule as "one of the least
rational parts of our law") (authority and internal quotation marks omitted); Mattyasovszky v.
West Towns Bus Co., 313 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1974) (describing the rule as "harsh and
unjust"); Publix Cab Co., 338 P.2d at 711 (referring to the rule's "lack of logic and soundness as a
matter of social policy") (parentheses omitted); Gustafson, 263 P.2d at 548 (Phelps, J.,
dissenting)
(characterizing the rule as "an ancient and barbaric legal concept long since outworn"). See generally Mickelson v. Williams, 340 P.2d 770, 772 (Wash. 1959) ("The common-law rule as to the
survival of tort actions has been the subject of most severe criticism.").
82. One court has observed that "the states generally used statutes (rather than judicial declaration) to abrogate the ancient common law rule against the survival of actions." Miller v. Apartments & Homes of NJ., Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 1981).
83. In this context, a survival statute is "a statute wherein the decedent's right to recover for
a tort survives, and can be enforced by his executors, administrators, or heirs." Rice v. Vancouver
S.S.Co., 60 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir. 1932); see also Sea-Land Servs. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 575
n.2 (1974) ("Survival statutes permit the deceased's estate to prosecute any claims for personal
injury the deceasedwould have had, but for his death.").
84. See Parkerson, 782 F.2d at 1451 ("Statutes allowing the survival of actions were intended to modify the traditional rule that an injured party's claim was extinguished upon the death
of either party."); Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at 406 ("The purpose of [a survival] statute [is] to alleviate in part the harsh results of the common law rule prohibiting the survival of any cause of action.").
85. See In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 625, 631
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) ('The overwhelming majority of states have survival statutes ....), rev'd on
othergrounds sub nom. Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992); Guyton
v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (observing that "most states have survival
statutes"), disapproved on other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir.
1984). But cf. Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 92 (Idaho 1990) ("[T]he Idaho legislature
has not enacted any statute specifically abrogating the common law rule of non-survival of causes
of action ex delicto in cases where the victim dies before recovery."); Thompson, 319 N.W.2d at
403 n.6 (observing that while "[a]lmost all statutes permit causes of action for injuries to property
to survive.... [only a]pproximately one-half of the states permit the survival of certain personal
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Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA s6 are silent on this question,"

and there is no general federal survival statute."' Thus, the state statutes
provide the principal reference point in assessing the survival of most
federal employment discrimination claims 9 (ADEA claims are an exception)," and generally apply to preserve those claims where the victim
of the alleged discrimination has died.9
Most state survival statutes reflect modem tort law's emphasis

injury actions").
86. See, e.g., Asklar v. Honeywell, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 419,422 (D. Conn. 1982) ("The ADEA is
silent on the issue of whether claims under it survive the death of an original party."); Ricca v.
United Press Int'l, Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1816, 1817 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The ADEA
itself is silent as to whether claims... survive the death of the injured claimant .... ).
87. See Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (D. Utah 1997); Rosenblum v.
Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (D. Colo. 1994); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., 87
F.R.D. 26, 28 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Earvin v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. (BNA)
481, 481 (E.D. Mo. 1995).
88. See Miller, 646 F.2d at 108 (noting "the absence of general federal provisions concerning survival of actions") (citation omitted); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1961)
(stating that "no federal statute specifically deals with the substantive issue of survival").
89. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589-90 (1978); Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1396;
Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1408; Kilgo, 87 F.R.D. at 28. As one federal court has noted, "[tihe
statutory mechanism that authorizes resort to state survival law to permit civil rights actions to
survive the plaintiffs [sic] death is 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F.
Supp. 282, 288 (D. Colo. 1982). That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[l]n all cases where [the laws of the United States] ... are deficient in the provisions
necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the
court having jurisdiction ... is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern.., in the
trial and disposition of the cause ....
42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1994). See generally Amnbruster v. Monument 3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd., 963
F. Supp. 862, 864 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("The default rule of § 1988 provides that state law governs
issues upon which the federal statute is silent.").
90. See Khan v. Grotes Metalforming Sys., 679 F. Supp. 751, 756 (N.D. I1. 1988)
(observing that "state law principles which govern survival.., are not applicable" in ADEA actions).
91. See, e.g., Slade ex rel. Estate of Slade v. United States Postal Serv., 952 F.2d 357, 360
(10th Cir. 1991) (allowing Title VII claim to survive under Oklahoma survival statute); Anspach v.
Tomkins Indus., 817 F. Supp. 1499, 1510 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that Title VII claim survived
the plaintiff's death because "[t]he relevant [state] statute for survival of actions ... provides that
personal injury actions survive the plaintiff's death"); Kilgo, 87 F.R.D. at 28 (permitting Title VII
claim to survive under Georgia survival statutes); Earvin, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 481
(holding that Title VII claim survived the plaintiff's death under Missouri survival statutes). In
Allred v Solaray, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1394, 1398 (D. Utah 1997), however, the court held that
"ADA claims do not survive a plaintiff's death under Utah's survival statute." Cf.Lipka v. Minnesota Sch. Employees Ass'n, Local 1980, 537 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
a state statutory discrimination claim did not survive the plaintiffs death). For a critical examination of the Allred case, see Doore, supranote 19.
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upon the compensatory nature of damage awards.' Many survival statutes nevertheless preclude any recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering93 on the theory that, once deceased, an injured party cannot
benefit from an award of such damages.94 Litigants have occasionally

challenged the application of these limitations in employment discrimination cases, 95 arguing that they are inconsistent with the compensatory
and deterrent objectives of the federal civil rights laws. 96

92. See, e.g., Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1982) (observing
"that survival statutes were designed in accordance with modem theories of tort law, which stress
the compensatory rather than the punitive aspects of damages for any injury"); Moyer v. Phillips,
341 A.2d 441,444 (Pa. 1975) ("The broadness of the [Pennsylvania survival] statute comprehends
the modem theory of torts which is generally compensatory in nature.").
93. See, e.g., Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 167 n.12 (4th Cir. 1972) ("For
example, Virginia does not provide for recovery of the decedent's pain and suffering."); Denton v.
Superior Court, 945 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Ariz. 1997) (noting that Arizona's survival statute "prevents
recovery of pain and suffering damages"); Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 746 P.2d 285, 292
(Wash. 1987) (observing that damages for pain and suffering were at that time "expressly barred
from recovery by the language of the [Washington] survival statute"). See generally Berry v. City
of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1506 (10th Cir. 1990) (observing that "some states may preclude, or
limit, recovery for pain and suffering").
94. See Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996); Harrington v.
Flanders, 407 P.2d 946, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965). On the other hand, some state survival statutes
specifically authorize the recovery of damages attributable to the decedent's pain and suffering.
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.046(1) (West 1999); Alsenz v. Clark County Sch. Dist.,
864 P.2d 285, 287-88 (Nev. 1993) (discussing NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 41.100 (Michie Supp.
1993)). Indeed, "pain and suffering sustained prior to death is recoverable in a majority of jurisdictions." Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disapproved on other
grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Greene,466 F.2d at
166 ("The majority of states... permit recovery for pain and suffering under survival statutes.").
95. The limitations presumably apply in employment discrimination cases arising under state
law. In Californiav. Home Fed Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 990, 992
(N.D. Cal. 1989), for example, the court held that damages for emotional distress are recoverable
under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12966 (West
1992 & Supp. 1995), but that they do not survive the plaintiff's death under the California survival
statute, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1999). The same analysis undoubtedly would apply to damages for pain and suffering, because "California courts have long held that
emotional distress is a form of pain and suffering and thus actions based on emotional distress do
not survive the death of the injured party." In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, No. MDL817, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18643, at *10 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 20, 1991).
96. See, e.g., Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1398; cf. Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 44-45 (D.
Mass. 1990) (considering whether the application of a state statute "to allow the survival of compensatory, but not punitive, damages" in a Rehabiliation Act case was inconsistent with the compensatory and deterrent purposes of that federal statute). State survival statutes have also been
challenged on state constitutional grounds, although such instances are rare. See Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Minn. 1982). The few courts that have considered the issue
have generally rejected state constitutional challenges to survival statutes that preclude recovery
for a decedent's pain and suffering. See, e.g., Martin v. United Sec. Servs., 314 So. 2d 765, 767
(Fla.1975); Harrington,407 P.2d at 947-48.
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This article explores the merits of that argument. It begins with a
discussion of the Supreme Court's consideration of the interplay between federal civil rights law and state survival statutes,98 and particularly its seminal decision" in Robertson v. Wegmann.'O The article then

analyzes various cases that have considered whether state survival statutes precluding recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering are inconsistent with the compensatory and deterrent purposes of Title VII, the
ADA,"0 ' and other federal civil rights laws.Y
The article concludes that state survival statutes precluding recovery for pain and suffering may undermine federal deterrent objectives in
cases where the discrimination victim is terminally ill or otherwise infirm,' O3 and perhaps also in those rare instances in which the employer's
conduct causes or contributes to the victim's death.0 4 However, preclud97. The argument has federal constitutional implications because it involves federalism issues under the Supremacy Clause. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cI. 2; see Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F.
Supp. 840, 844 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 380 (Ala. 1983)
(Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also William H. Theis, Shaw v. Garrison:
Some Observations on 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Federal Common Law, 36 LA. L. REv. 681, 684
(1976) ("The requirement that state provisions not be inconsistent with the Constitutions and laws
of the United States states the obvious; namely, the supremacy clause [sic] of the Constitution
would continue to play its role in the law selection process.").
98. To the extent the Supreme Court has addressed the present issue, its analysis obviously
would be controlling. See, e.g., Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 582.
99. See Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993); see also Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(characterizing Robertson as the "leading Supreme Court decision in this area"); Doore, supranote
19, at 374 (describing Robertson as the "lead case in the area of survival of civil rights claims").
100. 436 U.S. 584 (1978). The Robertson case received some scholarly attention even before
it reached the Supreme Court. See Theis, supra note 97. It has been described as "perhaps the key
to the entire enigma" surrounding the survival of civil rights claims. See Tracy v. Bittles, 820 F.
Supp. 396,399 n.1 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
101. The article focuses primarily on Title VII and the ADA because damages for pain and
suffering are generally unavailable under the ADEA, irrespective of the survival issue. See Naton
v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 699 (9th Cir. 1981) ("All circuit courts that have addressed [the]
question have concluded that the ADEA does not authorize an award of damages for pain and suffering."). However, if damages for pain and suffering were recoverable in ADEA cases, the question of whether they would survive the victim's death would be analyzed differently than in cases
arising under Title VII and the ADA. See infranotes 423-53 and accompanying text.
102. For recent discussions of the survival of ADA claims in particular, both of which advocate the adoption of a federal common law approach that would be contrary to the analysis in Robertson, see William Booth, Survival Under the ADA: The Federal Common Law Standardfor Determining Survival Claims, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 269 (1998), and Tara L. Haluch,
Comment, Treatment of Americans with DisabilitiesAct Claims When the Plaintiffis Deceased:A
CallforUniformity, 48 EMoRY L.J. 733,758-64 (1999).
103. See infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the
plaintiff in a Title VII case had failed to establish that "work-related stress caused his long physical
decline and eventual death," but acknowledging that racial harassment to which he was subjected
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ing recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering is not inconsistent with
federal law in other Title VII and ADA cases. 5
The article also briefly discusses how the survival analysis in
ADEA cases differs from the survival analysis in Title VII and ADA
cases.' 6 The article ultimately concludes that damages for pain and suf-

fering would be likely to survive in all age discrimination cases if they
were recoverable under the ADEA, while noting that there is neverthe-

less some basis for reaching a contrary conclusion.'
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERPLAY
BETWEEN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND STATE SURVIVAL
STATUTES

A. Jefferson v. City of Tarrant
° the Supreme Court recently
In Jefferson v. City of Tarrant,""
9
granted certiorari' to review an Alabama Supreme Court decision"'
holding that a state statute.. limiting the plaintiff's recovery to punitive
damages"' applied in a civil rights action"' in which the unlawful con-

"could have been a factor"); Hamilton v. City of Houston, No. C14-89-00675-CV, 1990 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1091, at *4-5 (Ct. App. May 10, 1990) ("The record does contain evidence pertaining to
the effect of the on-going and generalized racial discrimination suffered by [the decedent] at work.
[His] key medical expert... testified that, in his opinion, this stressful work condition contributed
to cause [his] decline in health and ultimate death.").
105. See infra notes 241-411 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 423-53 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 438-53 and accompanying text.
108. 118 S. Ct. 481 (1997). For an interesting discussion of Jefferson by one of the attorneys
involved in the case, see Wayne Morse, Death Actions for FederalRights Violations in Alabama,
29 CUmB. L. REV. 11 (1999).
109. See Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 520 U.S. 1154 (1997).
110. See City of Tarrant v. Jefferson, 682 So. 2d 29 (Ala. 1996), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,522 U.S. 75 (1997). For an academic discussion of the Jefferson decision, see Scott
A. Boykin, Constitutional Torts, Preemption Doctrine, and Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, 28
CUM. L. REV. 39 (1998).
111. The state statute at issue in Jefferson, ALA. CODE § 6-5-410(a) (1994), is a wrongful
death statute, rather than a survival statute. The Alabama Supreme Court has explained the difference between the two types of statutes in the following terms:
Where an individual suffers an injury from the negligence or intentional conduct of a
tortfeasor, he or she has a common law action for personal injuries. If the injured person
dies of a cause unrelated to the subject injuries .... damages are recoverable under the
survival statute. If the plaintiff dies of his injuries, however, the remedy is under the
wrongful death act.
Mattison v. Kirk, 497 So. 2d 120, 124-25 (Ala. 1986) (citations omitted).
112. See King v. National Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 607 So. 2d 1241, 1246 (Ala. 1992) ("[T]he

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol17/iss1/1

18

Moberly: Evolution in the Civil Rights Revolution: The Survival of Employm
1999]

Evolution in the Civil Rights Revolution

duct resulted in the victim's death."4 However, the Court in Jefferson
subsequently dismissed the writ of certiorari for want of jurisdiction after concluding that the state court's decision was not final."5
Justice Stevens, dissenting from the dismissal of the writ, n 6 asserted that the state statutory damage limitations had no application because the damages recoverable in federal civil rights actions are governed by federal law."7 Justice Stevens acknowledged that state law may
Wrongful Death Act provides only for punitive damages, and compensation is not a factor in a
wrongful death claim."); Estes Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Bannerman, 411 So. 2d 109, 112 (Ala.
1982) ("It is settled that under Alabama law (Code 1975, § 6-5-410) the only damages recoverable
in a wrongful death action are punitive in nature ....
").
113. Jefferson arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996), often referred to simply as "§ 1983."
Section 1983 "provides a cause of action where civil rights are violated by those who act under
color of state authority." In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 625,
634 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992). Cases construing § 1983 are instructive in Title VII and ADA survival actions because all three acts are subject to 42 U.S.C. § 1988's directive to look to analogous state
law for guidance "[w]hen a federal civil rights act is silent" with respect to an issue. See United
States v. Morvant, 843 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (E.D. La. 1994). In Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39,
42 (D. Mass. 1990), for example, the court observed that "all... civil rights statutes [are] governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988." Cf. Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir.
1997) (observing that, as under § 1983, "state law governs the survival of statutory civil rights actions like [an] ADA claim"). But see Khan v. Grotnes Metalforming Sys., 679 F. Supp. 751, 756
(N.D. Ill.
1988):
Mhe state law principles which govern survival of federal civil rights actions under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 are not applicable [in Title VII cases]. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 directs federal
courts to refer to state law in deciding all matters which Section 1983 does not specifically address. Consequently, pursuant to federal statute, survival of federal civil rights
actions is a matter of state law. [Title VI], however, dotes] not contain a provision
similar to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Therefore, the court must look to the federal common law.
(Citations omitted.)
114. See Jefferson, 118 S.Ct. at 484. The state court held that "state law applies in § 1983
actions seeking recovery for wrongful death unless... it is found to unduly restrict the federal
claim," and that the pertinent Alabama statute did not unduly restrict the § 1983 claim at issue in
that case "merely because the statute" provides for recovery of only punitive damages. City of Tarrant, 682 So. 2d at 30 (citations omitted).
115. See Jefferson, 118 S.Ct. at 484. The federal statute requiring finality as a prerequisite to
Supreme Court review states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari... where the
validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right,
privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of... the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994).
116. Justice Stevens was of the view that because further litigation of the federal issue would
have been futile, the Court's prior decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)-from
which he had also dissented-required the Court to treat the state court judgment in Jefferson as
final. See Jefferson, 118 S.Ct. at 487-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp.
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govern the survival of such actions,"' but maintained that where the action does survive, "additional state
' 9law limitations on the particular
measure of damages are irrelevant." "
B. Jones v. Hildebrant
Although no other justice joined Justice Stevens's dissent in Jefferson,120 one federal judge has observed that now-retired Justice White,
dissenting from dismissal of certiorari in another case, Jones v. Hilde-

brant,"' had previously indicated that he also may be of the view that
state law damage limitations do not apply in federal civil rights actions.'2 In actuality, Justice White acknowledged that state law may be
relevant in assessing the remedies available in such actions.'1 However,
1320, 1326 (N.D. Ind. 1991) ("The availability of damages for constitutional rights violations is
considered a question of federal law and is governed by federal standards."); cf. Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969) ("[B]oth federal and state rules on damages may be
utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes.").
118. See Jefferson, 118 S.Ct. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generallyHess v. Eddy, 689
F.2d 977, 980 n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) ("In a civil rights damage action brought pursuant to § 1983,
rights of survivorship are to be determined according to state law."); O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("Many courts have held
that state law governs the question of whether an action under § 1983 survives the death of the
injured party ....).
119. Jefferson, 118 S.Ct. at 488 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. Berry v. City of Muskogee,
900 F.2d 1489, 1503 (10th Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court has not directly considered the issue,
but language in [Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978)] appears to encourage reference to
state law in defining the scope and content of remedies available."); Bass ex rel. Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1188 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that courts in § 1983 actions are to "look to the
most closely analogous state law to determine survivability and the appropriate measure of damages") (emphasis added).
120. However, at least one lower court judge has also suggested an approach whereby plaintiffs in civil rights cases would look to state survival statutes "as a means to bring [their] actions,"
while "appealing to federal common law on [the issue of] damages." Sager v. City of Woodland
Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 294 n.13 (D. Colo. 1982).
121. 432 U.S. 183 (1977). Jones involved a § 1983 claim asserted by the mother of a police
shooting victim on her own behalf rather than as a representative of the decedent's estate. See id.
at
183-84. The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari when the issue as framed during oral argument
diverged from the question that had been raised in the petition for certiorari, which involved the
extent to which state statutory damage limitations apply in § 1983 wrongful death actions. See id.
at 184-89.
122. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 293 (citing Jones, 432 U.S. at 190 (White, J., dissenting)); see
also Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1252 (7th Cir. 1984) (observing that "both the
majority and the dissent [in Jones] questioned the applicability of state damage restrictions on a
beneficiary's Section 1983 action where the deprivation of a [constitutional] right caused death").
123. See Jones, 432 U.S. at 190 (White, J.,
dissenting). For example, the Seventh Circuit has
observed that "[s]tate damage limitations can represent a well-founded concern by the legislature
that juries may over-compensate plaintiffs for... damages ... which are inherently difficult to
estimate," and that "[tihis concern may be equally valid in the federal Section 1983 context." Bell,
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his opinion in Jones also suggests that, at least in some cases, he might
subscribe to Justice Stevens's view.1 4
In particular, Justice White apparently was not persuaded that state
law can limit the plaintiffs recovery in a federal civil rights action
"where the remedy provided under state law is inadequate to implement
the purposes" of the pertinent federal statute.' 8 This observation may

suggest that a state survival statute can expand,'2 but not contract, 27 the
damages available in federal civil rights cases. ' n
C. Robertson v. Wegmann

Despite the views of Justices White and Stevens, many courts have
rejected the conclusion that the survival of remedies in civil rights liti-

746 F.2d at 1251. Damages for pain and suffering fall within this category. See Rhodan v. United
States, 754 F. Supp. 76, 77-78 (D.S.C. 1991) (observing that "damages for pain and suffering have
no market price and cannot be determined with exactitude"); Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 374 P.2d 53, 55 (Kan. 1962) ("Damages for pain and suffering are unliquidated and
indeterminate in character ....).
124. See Esposito v. Buonome, 647 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D. Conn. 1986) (citing Justice White's
opinion in Jones for the proposition that "state limitations on damages that do not serve [the] policies underlying § 1983 should not limit those remedies"). However, Justice Stevens did not join
Justice White's opinion in Jones, 432 U.S. at 189.
125. See Jones, 432 U.S. at 190 (White, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 379 (Ala. 1983) (discussing a
state statute that "affords a remedy beyond that... permitted under federal law," and thus "does
not, in substance, abrogate [a] plaintiffs remedy... for violations of § 1983, but rather expands
the recovery"); Seth F. Kreimer, The Source of Law in Civil Rights Actions: Some Old Light on
Section 1988, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 601, 632 (1985) ("[l]n most situations, it is not inconsistent with
the policies underlying section 1983 for a state statute to impose a higher level of... damages
than is available under federal law."). For the author's previous discussion of the use of state law
to expand the remedies available under a federal employment discrimination statute, see Michael
D. Moberly, A BetterADEA?: Using State Wage Payment Laws to Enhance Remedies forAge Discrimination,32 TULSA L.J. 21 (1996).
127. See Demarco v. Sadiker, 952 F. Supp. 134, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (observing that "a state
law cannot limit the remedies available under § 1983"); Estate of Lazar v. City of Ottawa, No. 81
C 1947, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12534, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 1983) (citing Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1969) for the proposition that "state law cannot under § 1988
contract the federal cause of action"). But see Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220, 223 (D. Colo.
1966) (applying state survival statute in § 1983 action even though "damages might well be limited under the survival statute").
128. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 294; see also Shaw v. Garrison, 545 F.2d 980, 986 (5th Cir.
1977) (observing that "state survival statutes have primarily been considered when their effect on
the plaintiff's [§ 1983] case was beneficial"), rev'd sub nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584 (1978); Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir. 1961) (stating that "Congress by the
language... in § 1988 intended to enlarge the civil right remedy by authorizing resort to state
law"); Theis, supra note 97, at 688 ("Generally, state statutes have been considered only for the
beneficial effect they would have on the plaintiff's case.").
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gation is governed by federal law, 2 9 relying primarily upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Robertson v. Wegmann. 3 ° Robertson was a civil
rights action premised upon prosecutions purportedly undertaken in bad

faith by a state district attorney.'

The original plaintiff died while the

case was pending, leaving no close surviving relatives.'33 The executor
of his estate then sought to be substituted as plaintiff"' in order to pursue the action on behalf of the estate.'35
However, the applicable Louisiana survival statute'3 6 only permitted actions to survive in favor of a decedent's spouse, children, parents
or siblings.'37 Because there were no such surviving relatives in Robert129. See, e.g., Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (rejecting as
contrary to the Supreme Court's "present interpretation" the proposition that the survival of remedies in a § 1983 action is governed by "federal common law without regard to state law"), disapproved on othergrounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (indicating that the Supreme Court has rejected the federal common law approach).
130. 436 U.S. 584 (1978); see Guyton, 532 F. Supp. at 1166. See generally Culver-Union
Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (observing that
"Robertson... held that states might validly create some limitations upon § 1983 ... recoveries");
O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1347 (E.D. Va. 1981)
("fhe applicability of... state survival statutes to § 1983 actions was confirmed by the Supreme
Court in Robertson .... ).
131. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 586. The prosecutions involved the alleged Kennedy assassination conspiracy that subsequently provided inspiration for the controversial Oliver Stone film
JFK. See Russo v. Conde Nast Publications, 806 F. Supp. 603, 608 (E.D. La. 1992) (noting that
the prosecution's key witness served as a paid consultant to Stone, and "even appeared in the first
scene of the movie as an actor"). For a recent book length treatment of the prosecution and the
movie, see PATRICIA LAMBERT, FALSE WITNESs: THE REAL STORY OF Jim GARRIsON'S INVESTIGATION AND OLIVER STONE'S FILM JFK(1998).
132. Prior to his death, the plaintiff had obtained a federal injunction prohibiting further state
court prosecution of the criminal charges then pending against him. See Shaw v. Garrison, 328 F.
Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1971), aft'd,467 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1972).
133. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 585, 587.
134. See FED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1) ("If a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court may order substitution of the proper parties."); Ambruster v. Monument 3: Realty Fund
VIII Ltd., 963 F. Supp. 862, 864 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ('The Court [sic] may, in its discretion, order
substitution of the proper parties if the claim is not extinguished by the original party's death.").
135. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 586-87.
136. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1971); see also King v. Cancienne, 316 So. 2d 366,
367-69 (La. 1975) (discussing the statute's legislative history).
137. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587, 591. In particular, the statute provides, in pertinent part,
as follows:
The right to recover... damages caused by an offense or quasi offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive.., in favor of: (1) the surviving spouse and child or
children of the deceased, or either such spouse or such child or children; (2) the surviving father and mother of the deceased, or either of them, if he left no spouse or child
surviving; and (3) the surviving brothers and sisters of the deceased, or any of them, if
he left no spouse, child, or parent surviving.
LA. CIv. CODEANN. art. 2315 (West 1971) (amended 1960).
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son, 38 application of the state statute would have resulted in abatement
of the action.19 Both the trial and appellate courts concluded that such a
result would be inconsistent with federal law,' 4 and therefore purported
to establish a federal common law rule 41 that would allow the decedent's federal claim to survive. 42
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed,'" applying
the Louisiana statute to bar the decedent's federal claim. 5 The Court
began by noting that because federal law is silent on the issue,"46 the
survival of federal civil rights claims is generally determined by reference to analogous state law, 47 except where application of the pertinent

Louisiana survival statute-would be inconstate law-in this case the
14

sistent with federal law.
The Court explained that in determining whether a state statute is
inconsistent with federal law, courts must look not only to the language

138. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587. The Louisiana Court of Appeals has held that "[tihe
chosen classes reasonably embrace those individuals that are likely to be most affected by the
death of the deceased and reflect a reasonably appropriate limitation on [the survival] right of action." Allen v. Burrow, 505 So. 2d 880, 888 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
139. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587.
140. See Goad v. Macon County, 730 F. Supp. 1425, 1429-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1989) (discussing
lower court decisions in Robertson); see also Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282,
294 n.14 (D. Colo. 1982) (same). The Court of Appeals, for example, stated that "[b]ecause Louisiana's survivorship provisions would cause [the] pending civil rights action to abate, we find that
Louisiana law is inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes embodied in the Civil Rights
Acts." Shaw v. Garrison, 545 F.2d 980, 983 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
141. See generally Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1510 (10th Cir. 1990) (Tacha,
J., concurring) (stating that where the "state law remedy for a survival action [is] inadequate, the
court should fashion a federal common law remedy responsive to the federal policies underlying
section 1983"); Theis, supra note 97, at 683 ("If the adequate protection of civil rights requires
survival actions for their deprivation, state law may help accomplish that end. However, if state
law is inadequate for the task, then federal common law, in conflict with state statute, must be
pressed into service.").
142. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 587-88, 590. In doing so, those courts were constrained by
the fact that there was "no well defined or established federal common law as to the survival of tort
actions for the vindication of personal rights." Pritchard v. Smith, 289 F.2d 153, 157 (8th Cir.
1961).
143. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 434 U.S. 983 (1977).
144. See Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
145. See id. at 593-95.
146. See id. at 589.
147. See id. at 589-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996), which permits resort to state law
where federal remedial provisions are "deficient"). But cf. Miller v. Apartments & Homes of N.J.,
Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 1981) ("The [Robertson Court's] decision that federal law is
'deficient' with respect to survival was brief and conclusory.").
148. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 588-90 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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of the pertinent federal statute,' but also the policies underlying the
statute.'" ° The Court then noted that the principal policies underlying the

federal civil rights statute at issue in that case, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,"' are
(1) compensating persons injured by deprivations of their federal rights,
and (2) deterring abuses52of authority by individuals acting unlawfully
under color of state law.
The Court held that application of the Louisiana survival statute

was not inconsistent with federal law merely because it caused the
plaintiff to lose the litigation,' noting that there is no basis for requiring
compensation of an individual suing as executor of a decedent's estate.

54

The Court went on to hold that the fact that a particular action

might abate also would not undermine § 1983's role as a deterrent,' 5 at
149. A state survival statute resulting in abatement is not inconsistent with the specific language of § 1983 because, as previously noted, the federal statute is silent on this issue. See supra
note 146 and accompanying text. As one court has stated:
If Congress wished to prohibit state abatement statutes in the civil rights area it
could certainly pass legislation to that effect. Congress has not chosen to articulate in
federal law any prohibition against non-survivability as contained within [a state] survival statute. We are not disposed to create such an inconsistency and to then wrestle it
into submission.
Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993);
see also Michael LeBoff, Comment, A Need for Uniformity: Survivorship Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
32 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 221,227 (1998) ("Opponents of a federal rule of survivorship... argue that
if Congress wants uniformity, it has the ability to create such a rule.").
150. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590.
151. For a recent academic discussion of the § 1983 survival issue generally, see LeBoff, supra note 149.
152. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590-91. The Ninth Circuit has observed that "while perhaps
not the prominent purpose, punishment is [also] a permissible purpose of § 1983 liability." Larez
v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 648 (9th Cir. 1991); cf. Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543
F. Supp. 282, 296 n.16 (D. Colo. 1982) (referring to "a third purpose under § 1983-retribution"),
153. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593. The Court explained:
That a federal remedy should be available ... does not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff (or
his representative) must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the state law to
which § 1988 refers us.... If success of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark,
there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then
always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant.
But § 1988 quite clearly instructs us to refer to state statutes; it does not say that state
law is to be accepted or rejected based solely on which side is advantaged thereby.
Id
154. See id. at 592. In other words, § 1983's compensatory purpose was not undermined by
the Louisiana statute because the plaintiff in Robertson was not within the class of persons protected by § 1983. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 295 (observing that the Court in Robertson concluded
that "§ 1983's policy of compensating injured persons would not be undermined by Louisiana's
survival law since mere executors are not truly injured parties pursuant to § 1983"). But cf. Ascani
v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that "federal statutory law does not
address ... who the injured parties are when the victim is killed").
155. The Court found "nothing in [§ 1983] or its underlying policies to indicate that a state
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least in cases where the conduct at issue did not cause the victim's
death. " '
The Court explained that because the Louisiana statute permitted
most actions to survive the death of the injured party,"5 7 even individuals
contemplating illegal activity who were familiar with the statute would
be cognizant of their potential liability under federal law.'58 And given
the virtual impossibility of purposely selecting victims who would subsequently die from unrelated causes' 59 and leave no surviving relatives
with standing to pursue their claims,' 6° application of the Louisiana survival statute was unlikely to have even a "marginal influence" on future
behavior.'6 1 The Court therefore held that the statute precluded the
plaintiff's claim, noting as a general proposition that state survival statutes should apply in federal civil rights actions unless they have an
on," and are generally "inhospitable" to, the
"independent adverse effect
6
federal policies at issue. 1
Robertson did not involve a state statutory limitation on the remedies available in federal civil rights actions.'63 Indeed, claims for compensatory damages, including pain and suffering, clearly survive under

law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivorship." Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590.
156. See id. at 592. One court has stated, somewhat exaggeratedly, that the Robertson Court
"repeatedly emphasized that its decision to apply the Louisiana statute to the detriment of the
plaintiff's case might be inappropriate in cases where the alleged misconduct caused the plaintiff's
death." Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 n.8 (S.D. Ala. 1986); cf.McFadden v. Sanchez,
710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the Robertson Court "pointedly distinguished a section 1983 claim for a deprivation of federally protected rights that caused the decedent's death").
157. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591, 592, 594; see also Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 295 ("[T]he
Robertson court held that § 1983's policy of deterring abuses of power by those acting under color
of state law would not be thwarted by appeal to Louisiana state law since most people do not die
unsurvived by family and, therefore, most actions would survive the plaintiff's death.").
158. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592.
159. See id. at 593 n.10 (dismissing the suggestion that state officials could "deliberately...
select as victims only those persons who would die before conclusion of the § 1983 suit for reasons entirely unconnected with the official illegality") (parentheses omitted).
160. See id. at 593 & n.10 (noting that the § 1983 claim abated because the victim of the
constitutional deprivation "was not survived by one of several close relatives" specified in the state
statute); see also Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(asserting that the § 1983 claim in Robertson abated "only because the plaintiff had no next of kin
survivors").
161. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.10.
162. See id. at 594.
163. See Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 118 S.Ct. 481, 488 n.2 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(discussing Robertson); cf. Miller v. Apartments & Homes of NJ., Inc., 646 F.2d 101, 107 (3d Cir.
1981) ("In Robertson, the Supreme Court decided that state law governs some issues of survival of
section 1983 causes of action.") (emphasis added).
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the state statute at issue in Robertson.'6 Thus, although the reasoning in
Robertson may be instructive in analyzing survival statutes that preclude
recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering, '6 the case is not
disposi1
five of whether such statutes are inconsistent with federal law. "

III. THE APPLICATION OF ROBERTSON IN TITLE VII, ADA AND

§ 1983

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES INVOLVING STATE SURVIVAL
STATUTES PRECLUDING RECOVERY FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING

A. The ColoradoApproach: Pain and Suffering Damages Can Be
Precluded

1. Rosenblum v. ColoradoDepartment ofHealth
In Rosenblum v. Colorado Department of Health, 67 an insulindependent diabetic'" brought suit against her former employer under the
ADA.' 69 She alleged that the employer unlawfully failed to accommodate 70 her susceptability to stress' by providing "a non-hostile, harass-

164. See Thomas v. Frederick, 766 F. Supp. 540, 560-62 (W.D.La. 1991); Caldaremr v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 634, 640 (W.D. La. 1982). The Supreme Court itself noted that the
Louisiana statute is in some respects more favorable to survivors than the survival statutes of other
states. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 591 (observing that "certain types of actions that would abate
automatically on the plaintiff's death in many States... would apparently survive in Louisiana").
165. See Bums v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV-96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13961, at *3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 1998); Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 583-84 (Ct.
App. 1996); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981), disapproved on other
grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984). But see Haluch, supra note
102, at 743 (characterizing the extension of Robertson to ADA cases as "alarming").
166. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583. See generally Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297,
1308 (S.D. Ala. 1986) ("A number of... courts have held that restrictions on recoverable damages
instate... survival statutes are inconsistent with federal law and therefore not applicable in §
1983 actions.").
167. 878 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Colo. 1994).
168. See id. at 1407.
169. See id. at 1405. One court that declined to adopt "a per se.rule that insulin-dependent
diabetes is a disability under the ADA" nevertheless observed that the disease "as a practical matter may always be found to be disabling." Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 631 (7th
Cir. 1998). But see Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994) ("In order
to have a disability under the ADA, one must have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activit[ies].... [A]n insulin-dependent diabetic who takes insulin could perform major life activities and would therefore not be limited.").
170. As a general proposition, the ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to fail to make a
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ment-free [work] environment.' ' 72 When the plaintiff died while the action was pending, 3 the employer sought a ruling that her personal representative" was precluded from recovering for the plaintiff's pain and
suffering 75 because such damages are excluded from the recovery available under the Colorado survival statute.' 76
Because the ADA does not address the survival issue,n the Rosenblum court noted that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,178 the right to recover
for the plaintiff's pain and suffering was governed by the Colorado
statute unless application of that statute would be inconsistent with federal law.'79 It then noted that the Colorado statute was not inconsistent
with the specific language of the ADA, 80 because the ADA "does not

reasonable accommodation to the "known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). For the author's recent consideration of the ADA's accommodation obligation, see Michael D. Moberly, Letting Katz Out of the
Bag: The Emfiloyer's Duty to Accommodate PerceivedDisabilities,30 ARIZ. ST.LJ.603 (1998).
171. The court observed that "[s]tress has a particularly adverse effect on diabetics." Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1406 n.2; cf. Sneed v. Montgomery Hous. Auth., 956 F. Supp. 982, 985
(M.D. Ala. 1997) (discussing doctor's report that stress is "harmful" to an individual with diabetes).
172. Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1408; cf Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 761 (6th
Cir. 1997) (discussing ADA plaintiffs contention that "his diabetes constitutes a disability [under
the ADA] and... his employer should have granted his request for the reasonable accommodation
of transferring him to a less chaotic station").
173. See Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1405.
174. After the original plaintiff's death, her daughter was substituted as the plaintiff in her
capacity as the decedent's personal representative. See id. As in the court's opinion, however, references to the "plaintiff' in this article are to the decedent, and not to her personal representative.
See id.
175. See id. at 1408.
176. See id. at 1409 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-101(1) (West 1994)). Subject to certain
specific exceptions not relevant here, the Colorado statute provides for the surivival of "[a]ll
causes of action." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101(1); see also Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455,
466 (Colo. 1981) ("By [the] statute's express terms, with the exception of defamation, all tort actions survive the death of the injured party."), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 430 (1982). However, the
statute also states that the recovery available in personal injury actions "shall not include damages
for pain, suffering, or disfigurement." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101(1); cf. Goldsmith v. Learjet,
Inc., No. 93-1475-JTM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2273, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 7, 1997) (observing that
"under Colorado law, damages in a survival action premised on personal, tortious injury are limited to economic damages").
177. See Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1408; see also Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 971 F. Supp.
1394, 1396 (D. Utah 1997); Estwick v. U.S.Air Shuttle, 950 F. Supp. 493, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996); see Kreimer, supra note 126; see also Theodore Eisenberg,
State Law in FederalCivil Rights Cases: The ProperScope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV.
499 (1980).
179. See Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1408 (citing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 58889 (1978)).
180. As a general proposition, the analysis of any ADA issue begins with the statutory language. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.granted, 119
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address the availability of damages after the plaintiff's death."18'
Citing Robertson v. Wegmann,8 2 the court also concluded that application of the state statute would not be inconsistent with the policies
underlying the ADA, s3 which it described as deterrence and compensation.' 4 Because the Court in Robertson held that the complete abatement
of the action at issue in that case was not inconsistent with the similar
policies underlying § 1983,185 the Rosenblum court held that the plaintiff
was precluded from recovering damages for pain and suffering under
the terms of the Colorado survival statute.'86
2. Reactions to Rosenblum
The analysis in Rosenblum has been cited with approval elsewhere. " " In Allred v. Solaray, Inc.,' s for example, the court relied on
Rosenblum'89 to hold that the plaintiffs ADA claim was barred by the
Utah survival statute.' 9 Although the survival statute at issue in Allred-like the one at issue in Rosenblum-precludes recovery for a de-

S. Ct. 790

(1999); Hemdon v. Johnson, 970 F. Supp. 703, 705 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
181. Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1409; cf. Booth, supra note 102, at 289 (urging Congress to
enact a "general survival statute" that would apply to "federal enactment[s] such as the ADA").
182. 436 U.S. 584 (1978); see supra notes 129-66 and accompanying text.
183. See Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1409. See generally Robertson, 436 U.S. at 590 ("In
resolving questions of inconsistency between state and federal law raised under § 1988, courts
must look not only at particular federal statutes and constitutional provisions, but also at 'the policies expressed in [them]."') (citation omitted).
184. See Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1409; see also Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1398 (discussing
"the ADA's policies of deterrence and victim compensation").
185. See Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1409 (discussing Robertson); see also Glanz v. Vemick,
750 F. Supp. 39,44 (D. Mass. 1990) ("The analysis in Robertson indicates that the Supreme Court
would not usually consider a state law allowing abatement of a cause of action to be 'inconsistent'
with a federal civil rights statute.").
186. See Rosenblum, 878 F. Supp. at 1409. A state statutory limitation on damages obviously
is less restrictive than a state statutory requirement that the entire action abate. See Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 665 (N.D. Ala. 1981). The district court that decided Rosenblum
had previously observed, for example, that "the fact that the damages might well be limited under
the [Colorado] survival statute does not require that the action itself be dismissed." Salazar v.
Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220,223 (D. Colo. 1966).
187. See, e.g., Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1398-99; see also Doore, supra note 19, at 393
("Because Rosenblum's estate was able to pursue pre-death earnings, the deterrence policy
[underlying] the ADA was arguably preserved.").
188. 971 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Utah 1997).
189. See id. at 1396, 1398-99; see also Doore, supra note 19, at 394 (characterizing Rosenblum and Robertson as "the cases upon which the Allred court relic[d] to determine that abatement
of [the victim's] claim [was] not inconsistent with the policies underlying the ADA").
190. See Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1398.
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cedent's pain and suffering,'9 the court in Allred went even further,'"
holding that the plaintiff's ADA claim was precluded entirely by the
state statute.19 While this holding is distinct from that in Rosenblum,"
there is little doubt that, if faced with the issue, the Allred court would
have applied the state survival provision precluding recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering to the plaintiff's ADA claim.'95
However, that result, and specifically the holdings in Rosenblum
and Allred, have been characterized as unfortunate'96 on the ground that
state survival statutes precluding recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering are inconsistent with the provision of the Civil Rights Act of
199 1'9 authorizing recovery for pain and suffering in ADA cases. 1' In
any event, there appears to be at least one circumstance in which the
application of a state survival statute to preclude recovery for a discrimination victim's pain and suffering might interfere with an important ADA objective."

Specifically, the Court in Robertson v. Wegmann indicated that
the deterrent purposes underlying federal civil rights law would not be
undermined by the application of a state survival statute in cases in
which the victim's death was an intervening circumstance' because de191. See Bills v. United States, 857 F.2d 1404, 1406-07 (10th Cir. 1988); Kynaston v. United
States, 717 F.2d 506,510-12 (10th Cir. 1983); Doore, supranote 19, at 376 n.42.
192. See Doore, supra note 19, at 393 ("Rather than posing the issue addressed in Rosenblum-whether restricting recovery... is inconsistent with the ADA-Allred poses the question
of whether complete extinguishment of a claim... is inconsistent with the policies underlying the
ADA.") (footnote omitted).
193. See Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1398.
194. See Doore, supranote 19, at 394 (asserting that Rosenblum and Allred are "easily distinguished").
195. See Allred, 971 F. Supp. at 1396 ('In addition to punitive damages, [the plaintiff]
sought... damages for emotional pain and suffering .... To determine whether ADA claims for
such relief survive the death of the plaintiff, courts look to the state's most appropriate survival
statute.").
196. See Booth, supra note 102, at 286; Doore, supra note 19, at 371; cf. id. at 390 (stating
that "the Allred court's reasoning is flawed").
197. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (1994).
198. See Booth, supranote 102, at 285-286. But cf. Haluch, supranote 102, at 741 ('"he Rosenblum court's analysis does not always result in a negative outcome for an ADA plaintiff's representatives.").
199. One commentator has asserted that "[e]xcluding pain and suffering damages in... survival actions is always inconsistent with the [federal] policy of compensation."
, supra note 149, at 236 (emphasis added). But see Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. 1293, 1305 (S.D.
W. Va. 1982) (concluding that the "policy... of compensating the victim.., is not in issue"
where the victim has died); Brovn v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981)
("The policy of compensation is not a factor in death cases ... .
200. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
201. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984) (characterizing Rob-
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fendants are unlikely to be able to select as victims persons who will

subsequently die from unrelated causes.' That reasoning is not easily
extended to ADA cases in which the disability at issue involves a termi-

nal illness,03 and may not apply in certain other contexts as well, such as
discrimination cases in which the victim is quite elderly or otherwise

infirm. 4
Employers in these situations may be particularly inclined to discriminate against their employees,205 and to delay any ensuing litigation
in order to minimize their potential exposure, 2 6 if a potentially applicable survival statute may result in the abatement of the victim's claims.!' 0
However, these perverse incentives~may also arise if the victim's death

ertson); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp. 840, 843 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (same).
202. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 & n.10.
203. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(finding that the defendant employer had violated the ADA by "discriminat[ing] against [the
plaintiff] on the basis of his disability, terminal cancer"), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 55 F.3d
1276 (7th Cir. 1995). See generally Booth, supra note 102, at 290 (referring to the "large number
of terminally ill plaintiffs... who seek to recover under the ADA for discrimination suffered as a
result of their diseased status").
204. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) (observing that declining health "sometimes accompan[ies] advancing age"); Caraballo v. South Stevedoring, Inc.,
932 F. Supp. 1462, 1463-64 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (describing employee in "failing health" who died
while his ADA and ADEA claims were pending). See generally Felix Shafir, Comment, Flawed
Assumptions: A Critique of Garcia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 301, 342
(1998) ("Civil rights actions.., often involve the elderly, impoverished, or infirm .... ).
205. See, e.g., Glanz v. Vemick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D. Mass. 1990) ("Given the high mortality of AIDS patients .... [employers] may in fact feel free to discriminate against them, taking
sanctuary in the knowledge that the... cause of action will likely abate."); Oliver v. United States
Army, 758 F. Supp. 484, 485 n.1 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (discussing Glanz); LeBoff, supra note 149, at
243 (indicating that employers "could be heedless of the civil rights of any person likely to die
prior to the conclusion of a... trial"); Doore, supra note 19, at 392 ("Knowing that the victim has
an illness to which the victim likely will succumb before the claim is adjudicated, a wrongdoer
may discriminate at will.").
206. One court has observed that "the ADEA's framers ... were concerned that delay would
prejudice the claims of older plaintiffs." Bums v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 696 F.2d 21, 24
(2d Cir. 1982); see also Caraballo,932 F. Supp. at 1463 (describing an action involving ADA and
ADEA claims that was delayed by "months of procedural roadblocks"); Doore, supra note 19, at
395 ("If... claims do not survive, defendants may be encouraged to manipulate the system and
drag out litigation until.., the plaintiffs succumb to old age or their illnesses."); Booth, supra note
102, at 286-87 ("Unfortunately, due to the high mortality rate for.., plaintiffs [with HIV or
AIDS], combined with delays in the federal docket, many may not live to see their ADA claims
fully adjudicated.").
207. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 45; Oliver,758 F. Supp. at 485 n.1.
208. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at45; Doore, supra note 19, at 393-94; cf Burns, 696 F.2d at 24
n.2 (stating that Congress "wanted ADEA enforcement to be... expeditious"). See generally
Doore, supra note 19, at 395 ("For the elderly, sick, and dying, abatement of claims has the unfortunate effect of not ensuring that private and public actors have any deterrent to breaking the civil
rights laws-the very laws enacted to protect the rights of the elderly and disabled.").
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would merely eliminate the prospect of an award for pain and suffering.2 Thus, the Robertson Court's conclusion that the state survival
statute at issue in that case did not inhibit deterrence1 does not appear
to apply by analogy in these circumstances.21'
In short, the application of a state survival statute precluding recovery for pain and suffering in these situations could have the effect of

promoting discrimination against individuals with terminal or poten-

tially terminal conditions. 2 In Glanz v. Vernick,2 3 for example, the
court relied on state survival law2 4 to permit recovery for the decedent's
pain and suffering2 5 in a federal disability discrimination case.216 Citing
and quoting from Robertson, 7 the court explained that the availability
of such damages is necessary to vindicate the decedent's rights and
21s to discrimieliminate any incentive employers and others
219 might have
rates.
nate against those with high mortality

209. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Denton, 945 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Ariz. 1997) (observing that
where the plaintiff in a case in which a state survival statute precludes an award of pain and suffering is nearing the end of life, the defendant has "a great incentive to delay litigation until the victim
dies"). See generally LeBoff, supra note 149, at 243 ("A survival statute that prevents significant
recovery by any survivor offers little or no protection for the elderly, terminally ill, and others unlikely to live for the several years a... suit can take. [Employers] could violate these people's civil
rights at will and with very little fear of liablility.").
210. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592.
211. See, e.g., Doore, supranote 19, at 391 ("In Robertson, the Court determined that the deterrence goal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not undermined except by a stretch of the imagination. However, in the situation [in which the victim is terminally ill], that stretch is significantly less tenuous.") (footnotes omitted); cf. LeBoff, supra note 149, at 243 ("Mhe implausible hypothetical laid
down by the Court in Robertson becomes far more real under a state survival statute severely restricting what damages are recoverable.").
212. See Booth, supra note 102, at 287.
213. 750 F. Supp. 39 (D. Mass. 1990).
214. The state statute at issue in Glanz was the Massachusetts survival statute. See MAss.
GEN. LAWS ch. 228, § 1 (1996).
215. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 43-44; see also Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 224
(Mass. 1972) (holding that "a cause of action [for conscious pain and suffering] would survive [the
victim's] death by virtue of [the Massachusetts survival statute]"); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d
794, 798 n.3 (1st Cir. 1974) (observing that the Massachusetts survival statute "keeps... [an] action for pain and suffering viable despite the death of the tort victim").
216. Glanz arose under the Rehabilitation Act. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 40. Significantly,
"Congress intended that Rehabilitation Act precedent be considered by the courts in interpreting
the ADA." Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 676 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)); see also Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1995) (observing
that the ADA "codified much of the case law.., developed under the Rehabilitation Act").
217. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 44-45.
218. Although Glanz itself was not an employment case, the Rehabilitation Act clearly extends to disability discrimination in employment. See Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662
F.2d 292, 302 (5th Cir. 1981).
219. See Glanz, 750 F. Supp. at 45. The Supreme Court has likewise indicated, without elabo-
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B. The CaliforniaCourt ofAppeal's View: Painand Suffering
Damages Can Sometimes Be Precluded

1. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court
In County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,m the California Court

of Appeal reached a result contrary to that in Rosenblum v. Colorado
Department of Health."' The plaintiff in County of Los Angeles brought
suit under § 1983 alleging sex discrimination and sexual harassment in

connection with her employment.' The plaintiff died in an unrelated
automobile accident while the action was pending, and her personal representative then pursued the action on her behalf in accordance with the
terms of the California survival statute.'

The trial court held that the decedent's claim for emotional distress
survived her death despite the California survival statute's exclusion of
m The
damages for pain and suffering.2
employer then petitioned the

Court of Appeal for a writ directing the trial court to vacate that ruling,m relying on the appellate court's intervening ruling in Garcia v.
Superior Courtm that the California survival statute's preclusion of re-

ration, that the representative of a decedent's estate "may assert any right to monetary relief under
[the Rehabilitation Act] that was possessed by [the decedent]." Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630 n.8 (1984).
220. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
221. 878 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Colo. 1994).
222. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359. Although Title VII is the principal
federal statute redressing sex discrimination in employment, see Raines v. Shoney's, Inc., 909 F.
Supp. 1070, 1081 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), such claims are also cognizable under § 1983 when the employer is a state governmental entity, see Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist.,
934 F.2d 1104,1112 (9th Cir. 1991).
223. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359. "California law... permits survival
actions to be brought either by the personal representative of the estate of the deceased or by the
deceased's heirs." Falcon v. Richmond Police Dep't, No. C 97-2436 CAL(PR), 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17308, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 1998). See generally Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584, 591-2 n.7 (1978) ("For those actions that do not abate automatically on the plaintiff's death,
most States apparently allow the personal representative of the deceased to be substituted as plain-

tiff.").
224. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359. In California, damages for emotional
distress are analogous to those for pain and suffering. See Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 662, 664 (CL App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 935 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1997); Ambruster
v. Monument 3: Realty Fund VIII Ltd., 963 F. Supp. 862, 864-65 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see also supra
note 95.
225. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359.
226. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996); see infra notes 241-72 and accompanying text.
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covery for the decedent's pain and suffering m is not inconsistent with
the policies underlying § 1983.22
The County of Los Angeles court began its analysis'm by acknowledging that under Garcia, where a federal civil rights violation causes
the victim's death, the remedies available to the victim's survivors do
not include damages for the victim's pain and suffering."0 The issue in
County of Los Angeles was whether the same result is appropriate where
(as undoubtedly is true in most employment discrimination cases) the
victim's death is unrelated to the employer's conduct. 1
The court ultimately concluded that damages for pain and suffering
are recoverable in the latter situatione 2 because application of the California survival statute in such cases would be inconsistent with the federal compensatory objective2 3 The court rejected the contention that the

Supreme Court's decision in Robertson v. Wegmann' compelled a different outcome,"5 even though the victim's death in Robertson was also
unrelated to the unlawful conduct that had been alleged.f 6
In reaching this conclusion, the California Court of Appeal relied

upon that portion of Robertson stating that abatement of a particular
claim "should not 'itself' be sufficient" to compel the conclusion that a
state survival statute is inconsistent with federal law.' The holding in
227. See Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F. Supp. 230, 232 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that
"California's survivorship statute... specifically excludes damages for a decedent's pain and suffering"). The California legislature has resisted efforts to eliminate the statutory exclusion. See
Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 394 n.24 (Ct. App. 1981); Shafir, supra note
204, at 337-39.
228. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586-87.
229. The procedural history of the County of Los Angeles case is more complex than this abbreviated discussion suggests. Relying on Garcia,the Court of Appeal initially issued an alternative writ, but subsequently concluded that Garciawas not dispositive and, believing it had therefore acted improvidently, discharged the writ and denied the employer's petition. See County of
Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359-60. However, the California Supreme Court granted a petition
for further review and, also citing Garcia,directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its order denying
the employer's petition, issue another writ, and hold argument. See County of Los Angeles v. Los
Angeles County Superior Court, No. S053930, 1996 Cal. LEXIS 4695, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 21, 1996).
The Court of Appeal complied, and ultimately issued the opinion discussed here. See County of
Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360. That deicision in turn was recently reversed by the California
Supreme Court. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
230. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359 (citing Garcia).
231. See id. at 359-60.
232. See id. at 360.
233. See id. at 361.
234. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
235. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
236. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594.
237. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361 (quoting Robertson, 436 U.S. at 5923); see also Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1305 (S.D. Ala. 1986) ("The fact that the appli-
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Robertson, the California court maintained, thus was limited to situations in which the pertinent survival statute is not generally inhospitable
to survival,"5 and has no independent adverse impact on the policies underlying the federal civil rights statute at issue.f 9 In contrast to the statute at issue in Robertson, the court went on to hold, the California sur-

vival statute is inhospitable to § 1983 claims where the victim's death is
unrelated to the employer's conduct because its application in such a
case may leave the victim's survivors with no meaningful remedy."4
2. Garciav. Superior Court
In reaching that result, the County of Los Angeles court specifically

distinguished its earlier decision in Garciav. Superior Court,24' a § 1983
action brought by the decedent's sister in her capacity as personal representative of his estate alleging that he had died as a result of excessive
force inflicted by police officers during his arrest.UZ The trial court in
Garciastruck the plaintiff's claim for pain and suffering damages. 3
The plaintiff then sought appellate review, arguing that the Cali-

fornia survival statute is inconsistent with federal law. 4 She contended
that she was entitled to recover for pain and suffering experienced by
the decedent prior to his death in order to effectuate the federal policies
at issue in that case. 5
The Garcia court rejected that argument, concluding among other

cation of the Louisiana survival statute in the Robertson case ultimately resulted in the abatement
of the § 1983 action did not, in and of itself, mean that the survival statute was inconsistent with
the policies underlying § 1983.").
238. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361; cf. Weeks, 649 F. Supp. at 1304
("The [Robertson] Court carefully confined its holding ...to the unique facts of the case.")
239. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
240. See id. See generally O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp.
1345, 1349 (E.D. Va. 1981) (concluding that a state survival statute denying the victim any recovery "effectively calls for the abatement of the decedent's constitutional claims," and therefore is
"inconsistent with the compensatory ...policies behind § 1983").
241. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996). For a critical examination of Garcia, see Shafir,
supra note 204.
242. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581-82. A police officer's use of deadly force is a seizure
subject to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, and thus may give rise to liability
under § 1983. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). For a recent scholarly discussion of
this issue, see Michael R. Smith, Police Use of Deadly Force: How Courts and Policy-Makers
Have MisappliedTennessee v. Garner, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y 100 (1998).
243. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581-82.
244. See generally Kreimer, supra note 126, at 630 n.124 ("California's unusually comprehensive statutory code has generated several clashes with the purposes of § 1983.
245. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 581.
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things that § 1983's deterrent objective was adequately served by the
availability of punitive damages.2 6 In particular, the court noted that the
availability of such damages247 rebutted any contention that the unavailability of pain and suffering damages would create an incentive for defendants to kill rather than merely injure their victims. The court explained:
We are not persuaded by the hypothetical example of a legally knowledgeable actor calculating that he would incur lesser liability by killing
the victim than by injuring the victim. If we nevertheless indulge in
that assumption, we must also attribute to the actor the knowledge
that...
a jury could punish such conduct with huge exemplary dam249
ages.

Although the Garciacourt did not specifically analyze the potential
"compensatory" impact of a punitive damage award,70 there is support
for the conclusion that, in cases where the victim is deceased, punitive
damages not only serve as an effective deterrent,"1 but also serve whatever compensatory function 2 might have been served by an award for
246. See id. at 585. Punitive damages are recoverable under § 1983 in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980). But cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
256-57 (1978) ("To the extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should deter the
deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a deterrent more
formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages.").
247. Unlike damages for pain and suffering, punitive damages survive the victim's death under California law. See Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1997)
("California law permits a decedent's heirs or successors to recover... punitive or exemplary
damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived."); Roman
v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (observing that "punitive damages
are recoverable in a survival action" in California).
248. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585-86.
249. See id. at 586. See generally Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 648 (9th Cir.
1991) (observing that "deterrence is a primary, and common, purpose of both § 1983 liability and
punitive damages"); Thomas v. Frederick, 766 F. Supp. 540, 561 (W.D. La. 1991) ("The availability of punitive damages is central to the goal of deterrence inherent in § 1983 cases.").
250. The court instead observed that "[tihe deterrent purpose of [§ 1983] is satisfied... by
the fact that [the state survival statute] expressly allows punitive damages the decedent would have
been entitled to recover had he survived." Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585. This implicit distinction
is consistent with California law, where "[p]unitive damages are not designed to compensate a
plaintiff for actual losses." California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Carter, 210 Cal. Rtpr.
140, 143 (Ct. App. 1985).
251. See Bums v. City of Scottsdale, No. CIV-96-0578-PHX-RGS, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13961, at *5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 26, 1998) (holding that a state survival statute precluding recovery for
pain and suffering was not inconsistent with § 1983 because "the availabilty of punitive damages
serves both as an appropriate punishment and a significant deterrent as contemplated by § 1983").
252. See Monesson Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 348 n.5 (1988)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Arguably, damages for pain and suffer-
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the decedent's pain and suffering.23 In Brown v. Morgan County, Alabama,' for example, the court indicated that in cases in which the victim is deceased, § 1983's compensatory purpose would be satisfied by a
punitive damage award because the beneficiaries of the award would be
the same as the beneficiaries of any traditional compensatory damage
award--"the next of kin, or other beneficiaries of the deceased's estate." '5 In other words, because any compensatory damages awarded
under a state survival statute are intended to compensate for the decedent's losses,5 6 and thus may represent a potential windfall for the survivors,' the survivors are "in no way disadvantaged" ' (i.e., they are
not undercompensated)"9 if the only damages available to them are
punitive in nature.W
ing are... not truly compensatory."). But see Denton v. Superior Court, 945 P.2d 1283, 1287
(Ariz. 1997) (concluding that "[iln civil actions... pain and suffering may be the only compensable damages the victim may recover").
253. See Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12 (W. Va. 1982) ("Some courts have recognized that
from the plaintiff's standpoint punitive damages are additional compensation for the egregious
conduct that has been inflicted on the injured party.") (quoting Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283
S.E.2d 227, 233 (W. Va. 1981)). But see Georgie Boy Mfg. v. Superior Court. 171 Cal. Rptr. 382,
386 (Ct. App. 1981) ("[E]xemplary damages are not intended to compensate the injured plain-

tiff.").
254. 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
255. Id. at 664; see also Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373, 376 (Ala. 1983)
(adopting the reasoning in Brown); Boykin, supra note 110, at 43 ("The Cartercourt noted that
the ... punitive damages remedy satisfies the compensatory policy of § 1983.").
256. See Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282,288 (D. Colo. 1982):
Survival statutes simply allow the cause of action to survive regardless of the death of a
party. Accordingly, a § 1983 survival action, relying on the incorporation of state survival law.... is essentially the assertion of the cause of action that the deceased would
have had had he lived, requesting damages for violation of the decedent's rights.
257. See Kuehn v. Children's Hosp., 119 F.3d 1296, 1303 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[lf the victim is
dead the award of damages for his pain and suffering constitutes a windfall-the award is to someone other than the victim."); Bills v. United States, 857 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1988)
(indicating that a decedent's estate or "next of kin" would "derive a windfall" if they were compensated for the decedent's pain, and suffering); Love v. Wolf, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42, 54 (Ct. App.
1967) (noting the view that "the heirs of a deceased injured person should not receive compensation for that person's pain [and] suffering"); Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & Bergendorff,
672 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Kan. 1983) (Schroeder, CJ., dissenting) ("Recovery for [the decedent's pain
and suffering] by the heirs, under the guise of recovering on behalf of the decedent, results solely
in a windfall to the heirs .... ).
258. See Brown, 518 F. Supp. at 664.
259. See Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (concluding that damages for the decedent's pain and suffering "are not necessary to compensate his survivors"); cf.
Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 664 n.3 (Ct. App. 1996) (observing that the
decedent "is the only one who should be compensated" for his pain and suffering) (quoting Lawrence Livingston, Survival of Tort Actions: A ProposalforCaliforniaLegislation, 37 CAL. L. REv.
63, 74 (1949)), rev'd on other grounds, 935 P.2d 781 (Cal. 1997).
260. See LeBoff, supra note 149, at 238 ("[A] survival scheme, which provides for punitive,
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While this analysis is somewhat overbroad,6' it appears to apply
where the compensatory damages at issue are for the decedent's pain
and suffering, 2 because that injury is strictly personal to the victim,2 '
and a failure to compensate for it would not deplete the victim's estate.2 Indeed, that conclusion is implicit in the Garciacourt's observation that the exclusion of pain and suffering damages from a state survival statute represents a state legislature's considered judgment that
"once deceased, the decedent cannot in any practical way be compensated for his injuries or pain and suffering, or be made whole."
In addition, the Garcia court noted that the California survival
but not compensatory damages, [is] not inconsistent with the goal of compensation.") (describing
the holding in Brown).
261. For example, the analysis does not apply to damages intended to compensate for medical
expenses incurred by the victim prior to death, because such economic losses obviously deplete the
victim's estate, see Kynaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506, 511 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Any funds
made available through a recovery [in a survival action] ... compensate the estate for losses it has
incurred."), and an award of such damages would result in the decedent's survivors receiving "a
greater amount than they would if the estate had to pay the deceased's medical expenses, etc.",
Brown, 518 F. Supp. at 664; cf Weeks, 649 F. Supp. at 1309 (noting that "losses incurred by the
decedent's survivors" may include "expenses incurred in the treatment or burial of the decedent").
Thus, most state survival statutes "provide for recovery of... damages in the nature of hospital
and medical expenses." Gartin v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 749 P.2d 941, 945 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1988) (citing Barragan v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 722,724 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1988).
262. See, e.g., Holliday v. Pacific At. S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729, 736 (D. Del. 1953) ("There
is something incongruous.., in close relatives seeking to... increase their own financial profit
by... the pain and suffering sustained by the deceased unless, indeed, the damages might be considered in the nature of exemplary or punitive damages .... ).
263. See Kynaston, 717 F.2d at 510-11 n.10; Evans v. Twin Falls County, 796 P.2d 87, 94
(Idaho 1990); Sullivan, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 n.3; Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74,
76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
264. See Sullivan, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 n.3; see also Kynaston, 717 F.2d at 511 (contrasting
"the right of the injured person to receive damages to compensate his estate for its loss due to his
injury" with "the right to receive damages to compensate himself for his pain and suffering"). See
generally Barnes Coal Corp. v. Retail Coal Merchants Ass'n, 128 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1942):
Underlying the distinction between actions that die with the person and those that survive is the basic thought that the reason for redressing purely personal wrongs ceases to
exist... when the person injured cannot be benefited by a recovery.. ., whereas, since
the property or estate of the injured person passes to his personal representatives, a
cause of action for injury done to these can achieve its purpose as well after the death of
the owner as before.
265. See Cal. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1996).
266. Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; cf. Bills v. United States, 857 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.
1988):
In the case of an action by which the injured party recovers in his lifetime, intangible
items such as pain and suffering seem just and reasonable. But where the injured party
dies before judgment or settlement, the legislature may reasonably conclude that it is
unwarranted and incongruous to permit creditors of [the] decedent's estate (or even next
of kin) to derive a windfall by receiving pecuniary benefit based upon the pain and suffering experienced by someone else.
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statute does not prevent a decedent's survivors from recovering for their

own losses, 67 including, arguably, damages for pain and suffering."' It
relied in particular upon the availability of a state law wrongful death
action
whereby the decedent's surviving relatives can recover
"damages for being deprived of the decedent's society and comfort." '
The damages awarded to compensate for these losses are "akin to those
awarded for pain and suffering and emotional distress."2' In the Garcia
court's view, this prospect of what is effectively a pain and suffering
award arising from the victim's death was sufficient to satisfy § 1983's
compensatory purpose.'
267. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586. See generally Bell v. Macy's Cal., 261 Cal. Rptr.
447, 454 (Ct. App. 1989) (referring to a "right of action in [a] relative" that is "independent of any
belonging to the injured worker, and ordinarily could be pursued whether or not any action was
prosecuted by the worker").
268. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 586 (noting that California law provides survivor's recovery can include "noneconomic damages for being deprived of the decedent's society and comfort"); see also Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 935 P.2d 781, 789 (Cal. 1997) (noting that the
survival statute's prohibition of recovery for pain and suffering "applies only to causes of action
personal to the decedent and not to causes of action that others may have"); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Haw., 783 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (observing that survival statutes do not address the losses of a decedent's "survivors," but "the pain and suffering.., of the
decedent up to the date of the decedent's death") (emphasis added); cf. Frye v. Town of Akron,
759 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (discussing the "difficult question" of whether a decedent's survivors "may claim damages for their own pain and suffering caused by the alleged deprivation of the decedent's ... rights").
269. Unlike the survival statute, which "merely preserves existing rights of action personal to
the decedent, and available to such decedent during his/her lifetime," the California wrongful
death statutes, CAL. CtV. PROC. CODE §§ 377.60-.61 (West Supp. 1996), create a "new and distinct
right of action in a decedent's heirs", Georgie Boy Mfg. v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386
(Ct. App. 1981). For a recent academic discussion of these statutes, see Kimberly Jean Wedding,
CaliforniaWrongful Death Statute: Correcting an "Unintended Mistake," 29 MCGEoRGE L. REV.
453 (1998).
270. Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; see also Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341,
1355 (N.D. Cal. 1997):
California law provides, in addition to recovery by the representative of the estate on
the decedent's cause of action, a wrongful death action by decedent's heirs. Under these
provisions, designated surviving relatives or the decedent's heirs at law can recover pecuniary losses caused by the death, including pecuniary support the decedent would
have provided them, and noneconomic damages for being deprived of the decedent's
society and comfort.
(Citations omitted.)
271. Canavin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 196 Cal. Rptr. 82, 91 (Ct. App. 1983). But
f. Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Cal. 1977) ("California cases have uniformly held that
damages for mental and emotional distress, including grief and sorrow, are not recoverable in a
wrongful death action.").
272. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586; see also LeBoff, supra note 149, at 237 n.139
(discussing Garcia). But cf. Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1308 n.10 (S.D. Ala. 1986)
("[E]ven if [state] tort law does provide adequate remedies for violations of federal rights, the victims are still entitled to pursue their remedies ... under § 1983.").
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3. Distinguishing County of Los Angeles and Garcia
In distinguishing Garcia,the County of Los Angeles court emphasized that it had been the potential availability of these state law wrongful death damages that had justified the holding in the earlier case.273
Where the defendant's conduct does not result in the death of the plaintiff, by contrast, the County of Los Angeles court noted that the decedent's heirs have no claim for wrongful death. 274 It therefore held that
application of the California survival statute would undermine § 1983's
compensatory purpose in the latter situation. "
However, this analysis is questionable.27 6 The survivors of an individual whose death was unrelated to an employer's unlawful conduct

may indeed have few, if any, direct remedies against the employer.2"
Relatives of a discrimination victim generally cannot recover for their
own injuries under Title VII or the ADA, for example, because they are
not within the class of persons protected by those laws.? s The same presumably is true of most state employment discrimination statutes, 279 and
273. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360-61 (discussing Garcia);see also
Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 858 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 1994) ("[S]tate wrongful
death statutes have been borrowed to supplement § 1983 in the general area of wrongful death actions.") (citing Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984)), aff'd in part and remanded in part on other grounds, 84 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996). But cf. Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F. Supp. 1554, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("[S]tate wrongful death tort remedies do not
fulfill the deterrent purpose of section 1983.").
274. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361; cf. Cairl v. Boeing Co., 113 Cal.
Rptr. 925, 926 (Ct. App. 1974) ("Absent an allegation that the death occurred.., as the result of
defendant's conduct, it is difficult to conclude that California's, or any state's, wrongful death
statute applies ....) (citation omitted).
275. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361; see also LeBoff, supra note 149, at
241 ("Preventing recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering has devastating effects... if a
wrongful death action cannot be brought.").
276. The California Supreme Court has recently held that application of the California survivial statute is not incompatible with § 1983. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 981 P.2d
68, 79 (Cal. 1999).
277. In some cases, however, certain relatives (and therefore survivors) might be able to recover from the victim's former employer under one or more state law theories. See, e.g., Snyder v.
Michael's Stores, Inc., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105, 110 (Ct. App. 1996) ("When the spouse or child of an
employee is directly injured by the employer's negligence, and not as a further consequence of
injury to the employee.... California and most other jurisdictions permit the nonemployee... to
sue under general principles of tort law."). But cf.Anderson v. Northrop Corp., 250 Cal. Rptr. 189,
193 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[]f the tortfeasor employer did not direct conduct to the nonemployee
spouse .... no duty arises; and, hence, no cause of action exists ....
").
278. See, e.g., Patton v. United Parcel Serv., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1278 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Feng
v. Sandrik, 636 F. Supp. 77, 82 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Breen v. City of Scottsdale, 37 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1001, 1003 (D. Ariz. 1985).
279. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Fry's Food Stores, 806 F. Supp. 855, 858 (D. Ariz. 1990) (holding
that a discrimination victim's spouse "lacks standing to assert a claim against [an employer] under
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the analysis undoubtedly is unaffected by the victim's death. 8"
Nevertheless, conduct that violates Title VII or the ADA but does
not cause death clearly can give rise to state law claims on behalf of the
victim that survive in favor of the victim's estate." l In County of Los
Angeles itself, for example, the decedent presumably could have asserted any of several state law claims' that would have survived her
death 3 despite the California Court of Appeal's finding of the inapplicability of the state wrongful death statutes in that case.u 4 In fact, the
decedent's sister may well have done so.' Given that fact, the Garcia
the Arizona Civil Rights Act"); California v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 990, 993 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("There is no authority for the proposition that the spouse
of a party discriminated against by reason of a violation of the [California Fair Employment and
Housing Act] ...has a separate and independent claim for damages.").
280. See, e.g., Rovira v. AT & T, 760 F. Supp. 376, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Plaintiffs cite
neither authority nor legislative history for the proposition that discriminatory conduct.., aimed
at an employee's spouse, relative or 'significant other,' after employment has ended because of the
employee's death or another occurrence, constitutes discrimination in employment under the statute."); Home Fed.Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 992-93 (precluding alleged discrimination victim's widow from recovering "on her own behalf" under state employment
discrimination statute).
281. Indeed, one court has observed that there are "few violations of [civil] rights that will not
have some type of concomitant remedy in the state law." Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F.
Supp. 1554, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1983). For the author's previous consideration of the simultaneous
assertion of state and federal employment discrimination claims, see Michael D. Moberly, Proceeding Geometrically:Rethinking ParallelState and FederalEmployment DiscriminationLitigation, 18 WHrrriR L. REv. 499 (1997).
282. The conduct alleged in County of Los Angeles would have been actionable under the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("CFEHA"), CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12966
(West 1992 & Supp. 1995), for example, and a claim under that act could have been asserted simultaneously with the plaintiff's § 1983 claim, see, e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community
College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff also could have asserted a
common law wrongful discharge claim premised upon the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. See Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 373, 388 (Cal. 1990). But cf. Cook v. Lindsay
Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that "the California legislature intended the [CFEHA] to be the exclusive remedy for a discriminatory wrongful discharge").
283. See Jackson v. East Bay Hosp., 980 F. Supp. 1341, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 1997) ("California
law permits a decedent's heirs or successors to recover damages resulting from the loss or damage
that the decedent sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to recover had the decedent lived.").
284. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361. However, the decedent's claim for
emotional distress under the CFEHA presumably would not have survived her death. See California v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 51 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 990, 992 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
("Although emotional distress damages may be recovered under the CFEHA, they do not survive
the death of the injured party.").
285. The court noted that the decedent originally sought relief "on a variety of theories, including violations of the federal Civil Rights Acts", County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
359, but that the only question raised by the petition for review, and thus the only one it was deciding, was whether the state survival statute's prohibition of recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering "applies to claims brought by the decedent's representative under section 1983", Id. at 360
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court's conclusion that the availability of alternative state law remedies
may be sufficient to satisfy § 1983's compensatory purpose, which the
County of Los Angeles court acknowledged makes "perfect sense" in
cases where the employer's conduct caused the victim's death," may be
equally applicable where the victim's death is unrelated to the employer's conduct.2
Significantly, the California Supreme Court recently reversed the
California Court of Appeal's ruling in County of Los Angeles, 9 albeit
on slightly different grounds.2' Noting that its analysis was consistent
with that of the Colorado district court in Rosenblum v. Colorado Department of Health,21 the California Supreme Court held that the California survival statute's prohibition of recovery for a decedent's pain
and suffering is not inconsistent with the compensatory or deterrent objectives of the federal civil rights laws.2' Among other things, the court

n.3 (ellipses omitted). The California Supreme Court likewise noted that the decedent had asserted
"violations of state law as well as a federal [claim]." County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 981
P.2d 68, 69 (Cal. 1999).
286. See Garcia,49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586.
287. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361. Garciawas also cited with apparent
approval in Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571, 573 n.2 (Ct. App. 1998).
288. In Carterv. City of Birmingham,444 So. 2d 373, 380 (Ala. 1983), for example, the Alabama Supreme Court engaged in essentially the same analysis as the Garcia court, holding that a
state statute precluding the recovery of compensatory damages in wrongful death cases is not inconsistent with § 1983 because an alternative state law remedy is available in such cases. See also
Blair v. City of Rainbow City, 542 So. 2d 275, 277 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Carterand characterizing
its analysis as consistent with Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978)). Although Justice
Richard Jones dissented in Carter,he noted that the court's reasoning applies in all § 1983 survival cases, and not merely those in which the defendant's conduct results in the victim's death.
Carter,444 So. 2d at 380 (Jones, J., dissenting). Addressing the issue the County of Los Angeles
court appears to have overlooked, Justice Jones explained: "Just as our wrongful death act affords
a state remedy where death results from conduct proscribed by § 1983, our statutory and common
law affords certain remedies for personal injury resulting from the same culpable conduct [that
does not result in death]." Id.
289. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
290. In fact, the California Supreme Court declined to express a view as to whether the state
survivial statute's preclusion of damages for the decedent's pain and suffering would apply in
cases such as Garciain which the alleged civil rights violation caused the victim's death. See id. at
78 n.6.
291. 878 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Colo. 1994); see supranotes 168-87 and accompanying text.
292. See County of Los Angeles, 981 P.2d 75-78 & n.5. With respect to the federal deterent
objective, the court stated:
To conclude that [the statute's] limitation on damages could have any influence on the
behavior of public officials and employees, we would have to accept, to paraphrase the
high court, the "farfetched" proposition that they would have both the desire and
ablility to select as sexual harassment victims only those who will die before resolution
of a civil rights lawsuit and whose only compensable injury will be emotional distress.
Id. at 76 (quoting Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 592 n.10 (1978)).
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concluded that the statute permits the decedent's estate to recover all
damages to which the decedent would have been entitled except those

for pain and suffering,293 and that the California legislature had rea-

sonably concluded that pain and suffering injuries are strictly personal
to the decedent, and thus are not transmissible to the estate.294
The California Supreme Court also indicated that its analysis was
not altered by the fact that the statute's application may preclude any
recovery in some sexual harassment cases because harassment victims
may not suffer any lost wages or other recoverable pecuniary losses" that is, because compensation for pain and suffering may be the only
significant component of compensation in a sexual harassment case.296
Quoting the Supreme Court's observation in Robertson v. Wegmann"'
that a state survival statute "cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with
federal law merely because it causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation," 29 the County of Los Angeles court concluded that the California
statute does not conflict with the federal civil rights laws even if its
application
would eliminate all recovery in some sexual harassment
299
cases.

293. See id. at 75-77. "[U]nder California's survival law, an estate can recover not only the
deceased plaintiff's lost wages, medical expenses, and any other pecuniary losses incurred before
death, but also punitive or exemplary damages." Id. at 75.
294. See id. at 76-78. The Court explained:
Essentially, the line drawn by the Legislature approximates the pecuniary out-ofpocket losses the deceased plaintiff experienced because of the defendant's unlawful
behavior. These pecuniary losses, such as lost or reduced wages or expenses of medical
care, actually reduced the plaintiff's income or increased the plaintiff's pecuniary expenses. If uncompensated, these pecuniary losses would reduce the value of the estate
below what it would have been in the absence of the defendant's harmful conduct by
reducing the plaintiff's lifetime income or by increasing the plaintiff's lifetime expenses. By contrast, when the plaintiff experiences emotional distress, the loss is nonpecuniary. Psychic injury, while it can be psychologically devastating, does not itself
reduce income or increase expenses. Therefore, psychic injury does not reduce the
value of the plaintiff's estate compared to what it would have been in the absence of the
injury, and the Legislature's decision not to allow the estate to recover damages for
such injury was reasonable.
Id. at 76 (footnote omitted).
295. This was not the case in County of Los Angeles, however, because "in addition to damages for emotional distress, the estate [was] seek[ing] compensation for the deceased plaintiff's
back wages as a result of alleged wrongful termination, a remedy available under California's survival law." Id. at 77.
296. See id. at 76-77. The court observed that "the very essence of the harm suffered by any
victim of sexual harassment is an affront to personal dignity." Id. at 77.
297. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
298. County of Los Angeles, 981 P.2d at 77 (quoting Robertson, 584 U.S. at 593).
299. See ia at 77 & n.4. The court did note, however, that the United States Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed "whether a state survival law precluding a deceased plaintiff's estate
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C. The Impact of the Victim's Cause of Death

Despite the California Court of Appeal's questionable analysis in
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,3° that court may have been
correct in concluding that the survival of employment discrimination
claims for pain and suffering depends upon whether the employer's
conduct causes the victim's deathY1 However, the impact of this issue
appears to be precisely the opposite of what the California Court of Appeal perceived it to be.sr In particular, a state survival provision precluding the recovery of damages for the decedent's pain and suffering may
be inconsistent with federal deterrent objectives in discrimination cases
in which the employer's conduct causes or contributes to the victim's
death.30 3 That conclusion stems primarily from the Supreme Court's
analysis in Carlson v. Green,3" a case decided two years after its landmark decision in Robertson v. Wegmann

from recovering damages for the deceased plaintiff's emotional distress would conflict with the
compensation and deterrence goals of the federal civil rights statute in a sexual harassment case in
which emotional distress was the only compensable injury." IL
300. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
301. In Garciav. SuperiorCourt, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996), for example, the California Court of Appeal noted that the Robertson Court permitted a civil rights claim to abate under
the terms of a state survival statute where the victim's death was "unrelated to the civil rights violation," but that the Court's reasoning suggests that the outcome in that case might have been different "if the civil rights violation [had] caused the death." Id. at 583-84. But cf. Ascani v. Hughes,
470 So. 2d 207, 210 (La. CL App.) ("Following the rationale of Robertson, there is no reason to
reach a different result where the [defendant's conduct] results in death .... ), review denied, 472
So. 2d 919 (La. 1985).
302. Compare County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360 (concluding that a survival
statute precluding recovery for pain and suffering is inconsistent with federal law when the employer's conduct is "unrelated" to the victim's death) with Doore, supra note 19, at 394 ("Clearly,
the situation in which the discrimination is related to the cause of death presents a special case
where abatement of the claims is inconsistent with the policies underlying the ADA or other civil
rights statutes."). See generally Bills v. United States, 857 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1988)
(concluding that an award to survivors for the decedent's pain and suffering may be "particularly"
unwarranted "in cases where the death was caused by extraneous factors unrelated to the tortfeasor's wrongdoing").
303. See McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that
"limitations in a state survival statute have no application to a [federal civil rights action] brought
to redress a denial of rights that caused the decedent's death"); Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp.
1293, 1303 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) ("[S]urvival of a civil rights cause of action serves to deter official
misconduct resulting in death.").
304. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
305. 436 U.S. 584 (1978). See generally Jones, 533 F. Supp. at 1303 ("Carlson and Robertson seem to lend special significance to scenarios where [unlawful conduct is] followed by resultant death.").
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1. Carlsonv. Green
Carlsoninvolved a claim asserted against federal officials directly
under the United States Constitution pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,°6 an earlier Supreme
Court decision recognizing a cause of action in which "federal agents, as
individuals, are liable for damages resulting from their actions when
acting under color of federal law."' Like § 1983, °' Title VII,"' and the
ADA,310 Bivens is silent with respect to whether claims asserted thereunder survive the death of the injured party."'
Carlson arose out of the death of the plaintiff's son while incarcerated in a federal prison.3" 2 The plaintiff contended that the failure of
prison officials to provide adequate medical attention caused her son's
death,1 3 thereby violating his Eighth Amendment rights."4 Under the

306. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). One federal appellate court has observed that "[flew opinions have
stirred as much debate as Bivens." Turpin v. Mallet, 579 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1978). See generally Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens ConstitutionalTort: An Unfulfilled Promise,67 N.C. L. REV.
337 (1989) (discussing Bivens).
307. Shannon v. General Elec. Co., 812 F. Supp. 308, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (characterizing
Bivens). Implying such a cause of action directly from the Constitution was deemed necessary because a claim under § 1983 (the civil rights statute at issue in Robertson) "requires action under
color of state law", Martinez v. Winner,771 F.2d 424, 441 (10th Cir. 1985), and thus "does not
apply to those who act under color of federal law", Bush v. Bays, 463 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Va.
1978). As the Supreme Court itself has noted:
The § 1983 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional rights. That Congess
decided.., to enact legislation specifically requiring state officials to respond in federal court for their failures to observe the constitutional limitations on their powers is
hardly a reason for excusing their federal counterparts for the identical constitutional
transgressions.
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
308. See Hess v. Eddy, 689 F.2d 977, 980 (11th Cir. 1982); Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703
P.2d 1, 10-11 (Cal. 1985); Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 288 (D. Colo.
1982).
309. See Estwick v. U.S.Air Shuttle, 950 F. Supp. 493, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Earvin v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 481, (E.D. Mo. 1995); Kilgo v. Bowman
Transp., Inc., 87 F.R.D. 26,28 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
310. See Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (D. Utah. 1997); Estwick, 950 F.
Supp. at 498; Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (D. Colo. 1994).
311. See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 1977) ("Neither the Civil Rights
Acts nor the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens speaks to the abatement or survival of actions
brought thereunder."); Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1978) (noting the "absence of
any applicable federal survivorship rule" in Bivens actions), ajfd,446 U.S. 14 (1980).
312. See Carlson,446 U.S. at 16 & n.1.
313. In particular, the prison officials were alleged to have provided improper medical care
for the decedent's chronic asthmatic condition. See id. at 16 n.1.
314. See id. at 16. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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applicable state law, however, "a personal injury claim does not survive
where the acts complained of caused the victim's death. 3 '5
The Court rejected the argument that it should look to this state law
in assessing the survival of the decedent's Bivens claim,3 6 holding that
only a uniform federal survivorship rule would suffice to redress the
federal constitutional deprivation being alleged. It stated that whenever a state survival statute would result in the abatement of a Bivens
claim being asserted against defendants whose conduct caused the victim's death, federal common law applies to permit survival of the action. " '
The Court maintained that this result was not inconsistent with its
previous holding in Robertson,31 9 because in Robertson the victim's
death was not caused by the alleged constitutional deprivation upon
which the action was based.32 Significantly, Justices Powell and Stewart
suggested in a concurring opinion in Carlson that they would have
reached the same result if that case had arisen under § 1983,32 and the
The amendment has been interpreted to require prison officials "to provide medical care for those
whom [the government] is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976); see also Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) ('The Eighth Amendment
requires that prison officials provide a system of ready access to adequate medical care.").
315. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 17 n.4 (citing IND. CODE § 34-1-1-1 (1976)). On the other hand, a
state law wrongful death claim apparently could have been asserted by the decedent's personal
representative, and there was some dispute in Carlson with respect to whether the claim at issue
arose solely under the state survival statute, or whether it had also been asserted under the wrongful death statute. See id. at 18 n.4. As another court has observed, however, the wrongful death
claim "would have been a separate and distinct action and would not have derived or 'survived'
from plaintiff's original personal injury claim." Kynaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506, 510 n.8
(10th Cir. 1983). In any event, given its disposition of the case, the Carlson Court did not address
the significance of the potential state law wrongful discharge claim. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18
n.4.
316. The Court explained:
Bivens defendants are federal officials brought into federal court for violating the Federal Constitution. No state interests are implicated by applying purely federal law to
them. While it makes some sense to allow aspects of § 1983 litigation to vary according
to the laws of the States under whose authority § 1983 defendants work, federal officials have no similar claim to be bound only by the law of the State in which they happen to work.
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 24-25 n.ll (Harlen, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at
409).
317. See id. at 23.
318. See id. at 24 (adopting the reasoning of the lower court decision under review).
319. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1238 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the
Carlson Court "distinguished Robertson"); O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers,
523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981) (same).
320. See Carlson,446 U.S. at 24.
321. See Bell, 746 F.2d at 1238 (discussing Carlson concurrence); Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 651 F. Supp. 1248, 1255 (E.D. Wash. 1987) (same); Heath v. City of Hialeah, 560 F. Supp.
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analysis in Carlson may also apply by analogy in other civil rights
cases,32 including those arising under Title VII and the ADA."
2.

Applying Carlsonv. Green in Employment Discrimination Cases

One court has indicated that in light of Robertson and Carlson,
state law now governs the survival of most federal civil rights actions,
but that a federal "rule" permitting survival3 necessarily supercedes
any state law that would require the abatement of an action in which the
defendant's conduct caused the victim's death.126 Although cases in
840, 843 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (same); see also Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (characterizing incorrectly Justice Powell's opinion in Carlson as a "dissent"), disapproved
on other grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
322. In Kittler v. City of Chicago, No. 84 C 1649, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24714 (N.D. Ill.
July 30, 1984), for example, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985, which had been premised upon the contention
that (1) the Illinois survival act did not permit recovery for the death of the victim, and (2) "a party
wishing to bring a death action pursuant to §§ 1981, 1983 or 1985 must do so by virtue of § 1988,
which embraces state law, where applicable, providing for... survival actions." Id. at *2 (internal
punctuation omitted). The court noted that "since Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), Bivenstype actions against federal officers survive even where state law does not permit survival when
the death was caused, unlike that in Robertson, by the injury complained of." Id. at *2-3. Noting
that the holding in Carlson had also been applied by "extension" to permit the survival of § 1983
actions in which the defendant's conduct caused the victim's death, the Kittler court held that all
of the plaintiff's federal civil rights claims survived the decedent's death. See id. at *3.See generally Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1978) (observing that "actions brought under
the Civil Rights Acts and those of the Bivens-type are conceptually identical and further the same
policies," and that the analysis of the two types of actions is therefore similar), affd, 446 U.S. 14
(1980).
323. See generally Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1997)
(describing Title VII and the ADA as "statutory civil rights actions"); Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co.,
916 F. Supp. 797, 803 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("The ADA is a civil rights statute.").
324. See O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D.
Va. 1981). Indeed, this may even be true in Bivens actions, where several courts have held that,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Carlson, "questions of survivorship ... are decided by looking to state law." Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987)
(citing cases); see also Estate of Maselli by Maselli v. Silverman, 606 F. Supp. 341, 343 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("Federal courts have construed section 1988 to incorporate into section 1983 state statutes
governing survival actions, and have applied the same state statutes in Bivens claims.") (citations

omitted).
325. See Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 1984) (observing that "a federal court
can, notwithstanding abatement under the stricture of state law, declare the necessity for [the] survival of a civil rights claim thus, effectively, creating a 'federal common law' survival of actions
rule") (citing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-92); Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. 1293,
1302 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) ("In Carlson...,the Supreme Court opted for a federal common law rule
of survival ....).
326. See O'Connor, 523 F. Supp. at 1348; cf. McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d
Cir. 1983) (citing Robertson and Green in concluding that "limitations in a state survival statute
have no application to a section 1983 suit brought to redress a denial of rights that caused the de-
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which unlawful employment discrimination results in an individual's

death are undoubtedly rare, such a situation is certainly conceivable. 3
In Caraballov. South Stevedoring,329 for example, an employee suffering from pulmonary fibrosis33 brought suit under the ADA after his
employer allegedly refused his requests for reasonable accommodation,
and instead "continued to require him to work around hazardous mate33'
rials and airborne particles, in contravention of his doctor's orders."
332
The employee subsequently died while the action was pending. Although the court's opinion does not indicate whether the employer's
conduct was alleged to have contributed to the employee's death, that
may have been the case.33 Other employment discrimination cases in-

conceivably could cause or
volve allegations of employer conduct that
334

contribute to an employee's death as well*
Because they involved state survival statutes that would result in
the complete abatement of an action, 335 neither Robertson nor Carlson3 6
cedent's death").
327. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
328. In Cook v. Zions Fhrst Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the plaintiff
died from the effects of malignant melanoma after her employer denied her requests for time off to
have a cancerous growth removed. One commentator has observed that although Cook itself was
not actually a discrimination case, "such a situation might easily give rise to an ADA claim."
Doore, supranote 19, at 384 n.103.
329. 932 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1996).
330. See itL at 1463-64. Another court has observed that pulmonary fibrosis "results in the
formation of fibrous tissue in the lungs. It is marked by increasing shortness of breath, possibly
culminating in death from lack of oxygen or right heart failure." Home v. Heckler, No. 85-1904,
1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30489, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 1986).
331. Caraballo,932F. Supp. at 1464.
332. See id. at 1463.
333. See, e.g., Meyer v. A.B. McMahan Co., 130 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Minn. 1964) (holding that
evidence supported the conclusion that employee's "disability and death were due to pulmonary
fibrosis caused by his inhalation of the fumes arising from chemicals to which he had been exposed in his work"); Maczko v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 157 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ga. Ct. App.
1967) (considering whether an employee's "inhalation of fumes while at work" caused his death
from "a diffuse interstitial pulmonary fibrosis").
334. See, e.g., Paine v. Department of Mental Health Servs. of Calif., No. C-92-2953-SC,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1594, at *21-22 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1995) (holding that the plaintiff had established "a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not [she] contracted hepatitis as a result
of [an] alleged Title VII violation-discriminatory transfer to [a] hazardous waste unit"); Palmer v.
Schwan's Sales Enter. Inc., No. 92-1553-PFK, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14069, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept.
27, 1993) (discussing allegation that employer violated Title VII by retaliatorily transferring the
plaintiff to "an unsafe work assignment" in which she was "forced to work with harsh chemicals
without appropriate safety gear").
335. See Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207, 209 (La. Ct. App.) ("In Robertson ... the issue
was.., whether the action must be dismissed on the ground of abatement."), review denied, 472
So. 2d 919 (La. 1985); O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345,
1348 (observing that Carlson applies "whenever a state survival statute would abate the action").
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resolves the applicability, in federal employment discrimination cases,

of state survival provisions that merely preclude the recovery of damages for pain and suffering. 37 However, that issue was discussed in
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court.338

The court in the latter case affirmed its previously expressed view
that where the employer's conduct causes the victim's death, a survival

statute's preclusion of recovery for pain and suffering is not inconsistent
'
with federal law "insofar as compensation to the victim is concerned."339
The court nevertheless cautioned that the application of such a statute
would eliminate the only meaningful deterrent available"40 in cases

where "the primary component of damages... is recovery for emoM 1 Significantly, this is an apt characterization
tional distress.""
of many
sexual harassment cases, 2 although that situation has been altered to

336. Carlson did involve state law damage limitations. See Jones, 533 F. Supp. at 1304 ("[I]f
the decedent, as was true of the one in Carlson, is not survived by a spouse or dependent child or
relative, damages are limited to funeral, burial and other expenses incurred directly in connection
with the death, such as the costs of administration of the decedent's estate and medical costs relative to the injury resulting in death."). However, "application of the state law damage limitations
would have precluded the action entirely," because the plaintifff "could not, as a matter of law,
satisfy the... jurisdictional amount" if they applied. Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F.
Supp. 282, 295,296 n.16 (D. Colo. 1982) (discussing Carlson).
337. See, e.g., Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 118 S. Ct. 481, 488 n.2 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that the holding in Robertson "does not bear on the question whether a state
limitation on the measure of damages applies to a § 1983 claim"); McFadden, 710 F.2d at 911
(observing that Robertson "does not require deference to a survival statute that would.., limit the
remedies available under section 1983").
338. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
339. Id. at 362 n.7. Because the employer's conduct in County of Los Angeles was unrelated
to the victim's death, see id. at 360, this aspect of the court's opinion was dicta.
340. See id. at 362 n.7.
341. Id. at 361; cf. LeBoff, supra note 149, at 236 ("In actions where the predominant injuries
are emotional, excluding pain and suffering damages has the practical effect of abating the entire
claim."). See generally Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1399 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The major
item of damages in a survival action (aside from funeral and burial expenses) is recovery for the
decedent's pain and suffering between the time of injury and the time of death.").
342. See, e.g., Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 801
P.2d 357, 365 (Cal. 1990) ("[I]n harassment cases.... where no detriment to the employment has
been shown and the employee's out-of-pocket losses are minimal, the only injury is emotional
distress and the only redress is compensatory damages."); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F.
Supp. 261, 278 n.9 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (observing that in the typical "hostile work environment"
sexual harassment case, the plaintiff "cannot receive back pay or reinstatement which generally is
the primary relief sought" under Title VII); LeBoff, supra note 149, at 243 ("Since damages for
sexual harassment are primarily for pain and suffering, which many state survival statutes exclude,
the perpetrator... has no legal incentive to refrain from continued violations."); cf. In re Town of
Hemstead v. State Div. of Human Rights, 649 N.Y.S.2d 942, 943 (App. Div. 1996) (Krausman, J.,
dissenting) (observing that "mental pain and suffering.., is often the only consequence of discriminatory conduct").
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some extent by the Civil Rights Act of 1991's expansion of Title VII
remedies to include punitive damages. 3
3. Revisiting the Colorado Approach: Sager v. City of Woodland Park

a. Sager's Consideration of § 1983's Deterrent Objective

The impact of a survival statute's preclusion of recovery for pain
and suffering in cases where the defendant's conduct causes death was
also addressed in Sagerv. City of Woodland Park.3" The Sager court relied on Carlsone' and Robertson in refusing to apply the same Colorado statute 7 that was also at issue in RosenbIum v. Colorado Department of HealthM s because the defendant's conduct in Sager had caused
the victim's death. 9
Sager involved a § 1983 claim asserted by the parents and sister"
of an individual who had been killed in a police shooting. 5' In the

course of addressing the plaintiffs' motion to strike certain affirmative
defenses,352 the court on its own initiative raised the issue of whether the

damage limitations contained in the statute 3 applied to the plaintiffs' §

343. See West v. Boeing Co., 851 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D. Kan. 1994) ("The Civil Rights Act of
1991 expanded the remedies for sexual harassment by allowing victims to recover... punitive
damages.") (quoting Sara Needleman Kline, Sexual Harassment, Wrongful Discharge, and Employer Liability: The Employer's Dilemma,43 AM. U. L. REV. 191, 193 n.10 (1993)).
344. 543 F. Supp. 282 (D. Colo. 1982).
345. See id. at 295-96.
346. See id. at 294-97.
347. See id. at 291 (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-101 (Bradford Supp. 1994)).
348. 878 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Colo. 1994). The California Court of Appeal implicitly rejected
the analysis in Rosenblum, where the court held that the Colorado survival statute is not inconsistent with federal civil rights law (see supranotes 168-87 and accompanying text), in County of Los
Angeles. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1996),
rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
349. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 292-97.
350. See id. at 290-91. The court ultimately concluded that the sister lacked standing to sue
because she was not acting as the decedent's personal representative, as provided for in the Colorado survival statute. Id. See generally Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 466 (Colo. 1981) ('The
personal representative of the decedent's estate, by necessity, stands in the decedent's shoes in a
state survival action."), cert. dismissed,456 U.S. 430 (1982).
351. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 285,288.
352. See id. at 286,292.
353. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220,
223 (D. Colo. 1966) (observing that the Colorado survival statute "specifically limits the damages"
recoverable in a survival action).
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4

While acknowledging that the issue has not been definitively resolved, 5 the court concluded that the state statutory damage limitations

were inapplicable to the plaintiffs' federal claim.356 It emphasized that §
1983 damage awards are intended to compensate for and deter viola-

tions of federal constitutional (and statutory) rights, as opposed to state
law rights.3 ' Relying on Justice White's opinion in Jones v. Hilde5 and its own prior decision in Sanchez v. Marquez,359 the Sager
bran?'
court held that resort to federal damage rules was necessary to fulfill
those purposes, given "both the serious nature of a constitutional injury
and the corresponding importance of preventing its recurrence.',d0
In explaining this result, the court noted that a "full panoply" of

damages, including specifically damages for mental and emotional distress, are ordinarily available in § 1983 actions,36' while the Colorado

354. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 292-93 & n.11.
355. See id. at 293. At the time Sager arose, the Colorado Supreme Court had recently found
it "unnecessary to determine whether any inconsistency exists between the state survival statute's
damage limitations and the remedies required under § 1983." Espinoza, 633 P.2d at 466.
356. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 293.
357. See id.
358. 432 U.S. 183, 189 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); see supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. In particular, the Sager court quoted the following passage from Justice White's opinion in Jones:
It is clear that by enacting § 1983, Congress intended to create a federal right of action
separate and independent from any remedies afforded under state law. State law may be
relevant where a trial court is seeking to fix a remedy under § 1983, but it is by no
means clear that state law may serve as a limitation on recovery where the remedy provided under state law is inadequate to implement the purposes under § 1983. Thus both
federal and state rules may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in
the federal statutes.
Sager,543 F. Supp. at 293 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones,432 U.S. at 190) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
359. 457 F. Supp. 359 (D. Colo. 1978). In Sanchez, the court stated:
Since the survival statute does not limit the damages recoverable in this case, I
need not reach the question of whether.., damages in a Section 1983 case could ever
be limited or proscribed by state law. I am much persuaded by Mr. Justice White's dissent in Jones v. Hildebrant... and, if required, I believe I would rule that state law may
not serve as a limitation on recovery in a Section 1983 case. It is abundantly clear to me
that Section 1983 provides a federal right of action totally independent of any state
remedies. Such purported limitations would constitute an impermissible interference
with expressed federal policies.
Id. at 362 n.1.
360. Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 293.
361. See id. at 294. One court has asserted that "the primary component of damages in [§
1983] actions is recovery for emotional distress." County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
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survival statute precludes any recovery for pain and suffering.36 2 The
court maintained that the Supreme Court had essentially recognized the
anti-deterrent implications of applying such limitations in § 1983 cases
in which unlawful conduct causes the victim's death in Robertson,363 and
that this view had been confirmed in Carlson 64
The essence of the issue, in the Sager court's view, is reflected in
the following reasoning from the lower court decision that was affirmed
in Carlson:
It would be anomalous as well as ironic to hold that [a plaintiff can
seek] redress... [if] he survive[s] the alleged wrongdoing, but [where]
the wrongdoing cause[s] his death, the law is impotent to provide a
remedy to benefit his estate.... Allowing recovery for injury but denying relief for the ultimate injury-death-would mean that it would
be more advantageous for a tortfeasor to kill rather than to injure.
Surely this cannot be the intent of the law.'O
However, there are problems with this analysis.3 6 First, it ignores
the California Court of Appeal's conclusion in Garcia v. Superior
Court3 67 that wrongdoers are not likely to assess whether they could limit
their potential liability by killing their victims.? The Garcia court's
362. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 289 n.6.
363. See id. at 295. This is an overstatement. The Robertson Court did indicate that its analysis might not apply "in cases where the alleged misconduct caused the plaintiffs death." Weeks v.
Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1306 n.8 (S.D. Ala. 1986); cf. McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907,
911 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that the Robertson Court "pointedly distinguished a... claim for a
deprivation of federally protected rights that caused the decedent's death."). However, the Court
did not purport to decide that issue, but instead merely indicated that application of a state survival
statute "might be inconsistent with federal law if the civil rights violation caused the [victim's]
death." Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580,583-84 (Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis altered).
364. Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 295-96.
365. See id. at 296 (quoting Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 446
U.S. 14 (1980)); cf. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("To deny recovery for pain and suffering would strike at the very heart of a § 1983 action .... The inescapable
conclusion is that there may be substantial deterrent effect to conduct that results in the injury of
an individual but virtually no deterrent to conduct that kills its victim."), disapproved on other
grounds in Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455, 1457 (9th Cir. 1984).
366. See Garcia,at 587 ("[W]e are not persuaded by the lower federal court decisions allowing [pain and suffering] damages."). But see In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
778 F. Supp. 625, 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Allowing survival damages for pain and suffering comports with the ... policy goalol of... deterrence .... ), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ospina
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992); cf. Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 29
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 314, 321 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (observing that "the availability of compensation for emotional distress caused by employment related... discrimination might more forcefully deter such discrimination").
367. 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1996).
368. See id. at 586; see supranote 249 and accompanying text.
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reasoning on this point seems persuasive 6 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for
example, has criticized the suggestion that wrongdoers, relying on the
nuances of a state survival statute, would intentionally kill their victims,
rather than violate their rights to a lesser extent, in order to minimize

their potential liability. 7 Another state court has likewise characterized
that assumption as too simplistic for the realities of most situations,'
and "of some use only if the actor is consciously bent upon killing the
victim." ' And in actuality it may be in this latter circumstance (which,
in any event, is difficult to envision in the employment setting) 73 that a
survival statute is least likely to influence the actor's conduct. 74
The Sager court's analysis also ignores the potential availability of

punitive damages as an alternative means of deterring civil rights violations-another factor that influenced the Garcia court. 7 The court in
County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court 76 did consider this alternative,

but rejected it on the ground that, in reality, the prospect of a punitive
damage award was unlikely.3"

This assessment may have merit in the typical § 1983 case, where
the "target" defendant is a municipality, 78 and any individual defendants

369. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 301 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(characterizing as "implausible" the assertion that an individual contemplating the possible commission of a capital crime will "not only consider the risk of punishment, but also distinguish between two possible punishments").
370. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,50 n.17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
371. See Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993) (citing Carlson,446 U.S. at 50 n.17 (Relnquist, J., dissenting)); cf.Badia v. City
of Casa Grande, No. 2 CA-CV 98-0122, 1999 Ariz. App. LEXIS 40, at *22 (Ct. App. March 17,
1999) ("[I]t
is patently absurd to suggest that [individuals] are likely to engage in [unlawful] conduct based on the assumption that the victim will die within a short period of time, thereby freeing
them from liability for pain and suffering damages.").
372. Culver-Union, 611 N.E.2d at 705; cf. O'Connor v. Several Unknown Correctional Officers, 523 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Va. 1981) (discussing the prospect of "a state official contemplating such severe conduct" that it would "result[] in the death of the injured party").
373. But see McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental & Orthodontic Labs., Inc., 698 F.2d 676, 677,
679 (4th Cir. 1983) (discussing "a claim for racially discriminatory discharge following discriminatory harassment in employment" that had "culminat[ed] in an incident.., during which [a] fellow employee allegedly, armed with a handgun, threatened to blow the plaintiff's head off," and
the fellow employee "was later convicted of assault with intent to kill").
374. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring) (observing that "many, and
probably most, capital crimes cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment").
375. See Garcia, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 585-86; cf.Bowling v. Oldham, 753 F. Supp, 588, 590
(M.D.N.C. 1990) ("The policy of preventing abuses of power by state officials is satisfied by the
availability of punitive damages.").
376. 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1996), rev'd, 981 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1999).
377. See id. at 362 n.7 (characterizing the potential for a significant punitive damage award as
"more imagined than real").
378. See id. at 361; cf. Board of Educ. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., No. 85 C 8349, 1989
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would be public officials,37 9 because punitive damages are unavailable
against municipalities8 ' and "may be limited as against any individual
38 The analysis
defendants by ... the personal wealth of the individuals.""
is less convincing in Title VII and ADA cases,382 however, where the

principal defendant, typically a private employer,383 is now subject to a
potential punitive damage award.3 4
In addition, punitive damage awards are often based upon the
wealth of a defendant' precisely because they are intended to deter future wrongdoing,386 rather than compensate for the victim's injuries."
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10711, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 1989) (observing that "in most section 1983
cases, [a] municipality [is] a party defendant").
379. See County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361.
380. See id. at 361 n.6 (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981));
see also Morse, supra note 108, at 24 ("[A] decedent's estate may be barred from recovering compensatory and punitive damages from a municipal defendant in a section 1983 action for injuries to
the decedent.").
381. County of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361 n.6; cf. Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ("Mhe monetary nature of the
deterrent inherent in a civil rights action misses the mark in virtually all... situations. The violators themselves are not often wealthy individuals to whom a significant damage award would be
terribly meaningful.").
382. As noted earlier, County of Los Angeles is a § 1983 case. See supranote 222 and accompanying text.The analysis is also arguably inconsistent with the fact that, for most of the statute's
history, "municipalities were not liable for any damages under section 1983." Morse, supra note
108, at 24 n.63 (emphasis added).
383. Indeed, Title VII as originally enacted only applied to private employment. See Day v.
Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1203 (6th Cir. 1984). It was not until 1972 that the
act's coverage was extended to the public sector. See Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409, 416-17 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Tranello v. Frey, 758 F. Supp. 841, 851 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
384. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1290 n.4 (8th Cir. 1997); Graham v.
Leavenworth Country Club, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1066 (D. Kan. 1998). This is in contrast to public employers such as the one in County of Los Angeles, who continue to be immune from punitive
damage awards under Title VII and the ADA. See Joyner v. Fillion, 17 F. Supp. 2d 519, 529 (E.D.
Va. 1998) ("The Civil Rights Act of 1991 ... [exempts] 'a government, government agency or
political subdivision' from punitive damages.") (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(1) (1994)).
385. In California, where County of Los Angeles arose, "evidence of the defendant's financial
condition is a prerequisite to a punitive damages award." Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348,
1357 (Cal. 1991). "However, the view adopted in California... is not universally held." Chavez v.
Keat, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 72, 76 (Ct. App. 1995). The Third Circuit, for example, has specifically rejected the contention that "evidence of [the defendant's] financial status [is] a prerequisite to the
imposition of punitive damages." Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 734 n.14 (3d Cir. 1987).
386. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269 (1981) ("[Alllowing juries
and courts to assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances against the offending official
based on his personal financial resources.., directly advances the public's interest in preventing
repeated constitutional deprivations."); Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 813 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[O]ne
purpose of punitive damages is deterrence, and... deterrence is directly related to what people can
afford to pay."); Maxwell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 348, 362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
(observing that "generally the wealthier the defendant the larger the award should be" in order to
"deter others in similar circumstances").
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This suggests that in the case of individual defendants, in particular, a

relatively modest punitive damage award may well be sufficient to deter
future civil rights violations. 88 On this latter point, at least, the County
of Los Angeles court's reasoning is questionable. 89
In addition, there are other potential deterrents to unlawful conduct,

such as the prospect of criminal liability,39 that may offset the unavailability of pain and suffering damages under a state survival statute. 9' In
3" for
McNutt v. Duke Precision Dental & Orthodontics Laboratories,
example, one of the individual defendants was convicted of assault as
the result of a harassment incident that formed part of the basis for the

plaintiff's employment discrimination claim. 93 The possibility of such
punishment may be a far more effective deterrent than any prospect of a
civil damage award.3 4 And even in cases where that is not true,395 the
387. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 266 (observing that "[p]unitive damages by definition
are not intended to compensate the injured party"); Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir.
1992) (stating that "neither compensation nor enrichment is a valid purpose of punitive damages").
388. See, e.g., Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303, 316 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (finding that a
"relatively modest award of punitive damages [was] adequate... to deter [individual] defendants
from any further violations of the civil rights law[s]").
389. See, e.g., Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 831 (3d Cir. 1991)
(recognizing "the deterrent effect of punitive damage awards on individuals who violate § 1983");
Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1309 n.12 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (finding "no evidence that the
recovery of punitive damages against individual defendants under [a state survival] statute would
be inadequate to satisfy the deterrent... policies underlying § 1983").
390. See Rosario Nevarez v. Torres Gaztambide, 633 F. Supp. 287, 298 n.15 (D.P.R. 1986)
("Should punitive damages prove to be insufficient to... deter.., pernicious practices, perhaps
the next step should be the initiation of criminal charges...."), rev'd on other grounds, 820 F.2d
525 (1st Cir. 1987); Morse, supra note 108, at 29 (noting that an individual violating § 1983 may
be subject to "state and federal criminal liability").
391. One frequently overlooked deterrent is the prospect of declaratory or injunctive relief.
See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 823 F. Supp. 571, 580 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting that
Title VII and the ADA "expressly contemplated injunctive relief' in order to "ensure future
[statutory] compliance"), affid in part and rev'd in part, 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995). But cf.
Glanz v. Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 43 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that "the death of plaintiff's decedent.., mooted the demand for injunctive relief' in a disability discrimination case).
392. 698 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1983).
393. See id. at 677, 679. The potential discharge of such an individual also serves as a deterrent. See Johnson v. Northern Ind. Pub. Serv., 844 F. Supp. 466, 469 (N.D. Ind. 1994) ("It may be
presumed that employers do not wish to employ supervisors who discriminate and subject their
employers to liability. Thus.... potential termination from liable employers exists as an effective
deterrent."); Morse, supra note 108, at 36 ("[lt is implausible to suggest that a municipal employee will risk... loss of a job because damages are not recoverable against his employer [under
§ 1983].").
394. See, e.g., RosarioNevarez, 633 F. Supp. at 298 n.15; see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
14, 51 n.17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning whether "a [civil] remedy will have a
deterrent impact.., beyond that of ordinary criminal sanctions").
395. See, e.g., Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F.2d 464,468 (6th Cir. 1951) ("Obviously fear of criminal punishment has been an insufficient deterrent... in this case, if the averments of the petition
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existence of other state396 or federal damage claims that do survive the
victim's death3 may be a sufficient deterrent to overcome the unavailability of pain and suffering damages.3 98
b. Sager's Consideration of § 1983's Compensatory Objective
Another questionable aspect of the Sager court's analysis is its
suggestion that the damages necessary to fulfill § 1983's compensatory
purpose may exceed those necessary to satisfy comparable state law
objectives."' The purpose of any compensatory damage award, including an award for pain and suffering, is to compensate for the victim's
actual losses.w At least in employment discrimination cases, the amount
necessary to accomplish this goal is presumably the same regardless of
whether the employer's liability is premised upon a violation of state or
federal law. 4 ' In fact, state law compensatory damage awards may exbe accepted as true.").
396. See, e.g., California v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan, 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 990,
992, 994 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that damages for emotional distress were precluded by state
survival statute, while permitting decedent's personal representative to pursue decedent's remaining claims under state employment discrimination statute).
397. Compare, e.g., Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Lost
future earning capacity is a nonpecuniary injury for which plaintiffs may be compensated under
Title VII.") with Amoroso v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l Hosp., 901 F. Supp. 900, 903 (D.N.J. 1995)
(discussing a state survival statute that "allows recovery... for loss based on the prospective
earning capacity of the deceased").
398. See Doore, supra note 19, at 393 (stating that the ADA's deterrence objective may be
satisfied where "even just one claim" survives, such as where the decedent's estate is "able to pursue pre-death earnings") (discussing Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F. Supp. 1401
(D. Colo. 1994)).
399. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 293:
MThe purposes of § 1983-compensation for and deterrence of deprivations of constitutionalrights, not state law rights,-relate directly to the nature of the damages available in § 1983 actions. The damage rules applicable in § 1983 actions must, therefore,
address both the serious nature of a constitutional injury and the corresponding importance of preventing its recurrence. Such necessary damages may far exceed those required to satisfy the policies underlying... state statutes.
(Citations omitted.)
400. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (describing
compensatory damages as "damages grounded in determinations of plaintiffs' actual losses");
Murphy v. City of Elko, 976 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Nev. 1997) ("[Nlon-pecuniary pain and suffering is just as much an 'actual loss' . . . as loss of earnings.").
401. See, e.g., Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 982 F. Supp. 786, 787-88
(W.D. Wash. 1997) ('The plaintiff brought separate claims for sex discrimination under both federal and state law.... Since the elements of compensatory damages for the state and federal claims
are identical, the jury was not asked to fix separate federal and state compensatory damages."); cf.
Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, 980 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that "the recoverable elements of damages under [a] state law retalitation claim and [a] federal ADA claim are sub-
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ceed the permissible federal award in employment discrimination cases
because Congress has established specific Title VII and ADA damage
limitations' that apparently do not extend to parallel state law claims.' 3
In any event, the plaintiffs in Sager were suing for injuries to their

own interests,404 and not merely for those suffered by the victim directly. ' °5 Thus, the court's discussion of § 1983's compensatory purpose
may have little significance for most survival cases,406 because state
survival statutes generally do not limit the right of survivors to recover
for their own pain and suffering,o but only their right to recover for the
stantially the same" where the plaintiff is alleging "the same injuries under the two claims").
402. See EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(A) (1995)); Stephens v. Kay Management Co., 907 F. Supp. 169, 174 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (same).
403. See Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, 107 F.3d 568, 576 (8th Cir. 1997); Kerr-Selgas v.
American Airlines, 69 F.3d 1205, 1214 (1st Cir. 1995); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663,
675 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
404. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 295 ("In the instant action .... the plaintiff-parents ... are not
mere executors and are suing under § 1983 for injury to their own interests."). The Sager court's
reference to this fact presumably was in response to the statement in Robertson v. Wegmann, 436
U.S. 584, 592 (1978) that § 1983's compensatory objective "provides no basis for requiring compensation of one who is merely suing as executor of the deceased's estate." Another court has
concluded that § 1983's deterrent objective is likewise "not undermined by abating [an] action
against one who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased's estate." Strickland v. Deaconess
Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 77 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the latter conclusion is questionable. See Rose v. City of Los Angeles, 814 F. Supp. 878,
881 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (observing that fulfillment of federal deterrent objectives "cannot be made to
depend upon the entity bringing the.., lawsuit") (citing Roman v. City of Richmond, 570 F.
Supp. 1554, 1557-58 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
405. See generally Gates v. Montalbano, 550 F. Supp. 81, 82-83 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (noting the
"distinction between the survival of the claim of a decedent for injuries" and the separate claim "of
the decedent's next of kin"); Ascani v. Hughes, 470 So. 2d 207, 211 (La. Ct. App.) (observing that
"the claims of [a] decedent's estate" present a "different situation" from "the claim of decedent's
siblings for [their own] loss"), review denied,472 So. 2d 919 (La. 1985).
406. See Morse, supra note 108, at 27 ("Because plaintiffs usually do not seek recovery under
section 1983 for injury to their own interests as a result of a decedent's death, a court [typically]
has no occasion to reach the question .. "). The Sager court itself suggested that § 1983's compensatory purpose would not have been undermined by the Colorado survival statute if the plaintiffs were only seeking to recover for the decedent's injuries, because "mere executors are not truly
injured parties pursuant to § 1983." Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 295.
407. See, e.g., Variety Children's Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (Fla. 1983)
(discussing a Florida statute "allowing survivors to recover for their own pain and suffering while
abating the right of any recovery on the decedent's behalf'); Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen
& Bergendoff, 672 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Kan. 1983) (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting) (noting that a decedent's heirs are not precluded by the Kansas survival statute from "maintain[ing] an action in their
own right for, among other things, 'mental anguish, suffering, or bereavement'). See generally
Morse, supra note 108, at 35 n. 112 (referring to the "maze of conflicting [state] damages rules exist[ing] for survivors attempting to recover for.., pain and suffering of their own"). Indeed, the
analysis in Robertson suggests that a state survival statute could not constitutionally preclude survivors from asserting federal civil rights claims arising from injuries "to their own interests." Rob-
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pain and suffering experienced by the decedent. 4°'
In fact, the holding in Robertson v. Wegmann49 was based in part
upon the premise that § 1983's compensatory objective is irrelevant in

survival cases ' 0 because that objective simply cannot be fulfilled when
the victim is deceased."' In other words, because deceased victims cannot be compensated for their pain and suffering,4 2 and they are the only
ones who should be compensated for that injury,4 damages for pain and
suffering should logically abate upon the victim's death 4 Any other re-

ertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.9.
408. See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Honolulu, Haw., 783 F. Supp. 1261, 1264 (N.D. Cal.
1992) (observing that survival statutes do not address the losses of a decedent's "survivors," but
the "pain and suffering... of the decedent up to the date of the decedent's death") (emphasis
added). In other words, state survival statutes, like the common law actio personalisdoctrine they
abrogate, typically pertain "only to the victim's own personal claims, such as for pain and suffering," and thus have "no bearing on the question whether a dependent should be permitted to recover for the injury he suffers from the victim's death." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S.
375, 385 (1970). Thus, in Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 935 P.2d 781, 789 (Cal. 1997), for example, the California Supreme Court noted that the California survival statute's prohibition of recovery for pain and suffering "applies only to causes of action personal to the decedent and not to
causes of action that others may have ......
409. 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
410. See Bowling v. Oldham, 753 F. Supp. 588, 590 (M.D.N.C. 1990) ("Compensating the
injured party is immaterial [when the injured party] is dead."); Jones v. George, 533 F. Supp. 1293,
1305 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (stating that the "policy... of compensating the victim" is "not in issue"
where the victim is deceased); Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981)
");cf. Steven H. Steinglass,
("The policy of compensation is not a factor in death cases ....
Wrongful DeathActions andSection 1983, 60 IND. L.J. 559, 624 (1984) (observing that "[t]he goal
of compensation was disposed of almost summarily" in Robertson).
411. See Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698, 705 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1993) (c6ncluding that § 1983's compensatory purpose is "incapable of fulfillment" in
cases where the victim is deceased, because a decedent "cannot be compensated").
412. See Vulk v. Haley, 736 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Idaho 1987) (observing that "an injured person
who is dead cannot benefit from an award for his pain and suffering"); Brown, 518 F. Supp. at 664
("It is clear that where the injured party is deceased, any damage award would not compensate him
for his injuries, because the cruel fact is that he is no longer present to benefit from any damages
awarded."); Culver-Union, 611 N.E.2d at 705 ("Obviously, when the injured person is deceased he
cannot be compensated.").
413. See Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 664 n.3 (CL App. 1996)
(observing that the decedent "is the only one who should be compensated" for his pain and suffering) (quoting Livingston, supra note 259, at 74), rev'd on other grounds, 935 P.2d 781 (Cal.
1997); cf.Culver-Union, 611 N.E.2d at 705 (observing that compensating survivors would "not
accomplish the same goal" as compensating the victim); Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297,
'1309 (S.D. Ala. 1986) (concluding that an award of damages for the decedent's injuries was "not
necessary to compensate his survivors").
414. See Sullivan, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 n.3 (noting the view that "damages for a deceased's
pain [and] suffering.., should not be recoverable"); see also Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1996) (observing that a statutory exclusion of damages for pain and
suffering represents a reasonable legislative judgment that "once deceased, the decedent cannot in
any practical way be compensated for his injuries or pain and suffering"); c Harrington v.
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suit may effectively provide the victim's survivors with an undeserved
windfall.1 5 As one jurist has stated: "The reason for the [statutory] exclusion is the belief that since the decedent alone endured the pain and
can no longer benefit from the award, there is no reason41for
6 the survivors to be enriched as a result of the decedent's suffering."

In short, the unavailability of a particular remedy may not be a
sufficient basis for refusing to apply a state survival statute, 4 7 because
the Court in Robertson indicated that such statutes are inconsistent with
federal law only if they are "generally" inhospitable to the survival of
federal claims. 4I" Even courts like the one in Sager that have refused to
apply state survival statutes in federal civil rights actions have acknowledged that this standard is met only when the state statute significantly
Flanders, 407 P.2d 946, 948 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966) ("The Legislature apparently contemplated that
once an injured person is dead he cannot benefit from an award for his pain and suffering.").
415. See supra note 257; cf. Sullivan, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664 n.3 ("It does not seem reasonable that an estate should be enhanced by the value placed.., on the pain and suffering experienced by a dead man."); Holliday v. Pacific Ad. S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729, 736 (D. Del. 1953)
("There is something incongruous.., in close relatives seeking to [recover for] the pain and suffering sustained by the deceased ....). See generally Parkerson v. Carrouth, 782 F.2d 1449, 1455
(8th Cir. 1986) (observing that a desire to "prevent the victim's heirs from receiving an undeserved
windfall" may be a "sound reasonf1 for abating certain kinds of claims upon the death of the party
allegedly injured").
416. See Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & Bergendoff, 672 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Kan,
1983) (Schroeder, CJ., dissenting) (italics omitted); cf. Kynaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506,
510-11 n.10 (10th Cir. 1983) ("[Pain and suffering is a personal thing that's suffered by the individual; it's not suffered by anyone else.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, at least one court has criticized opposition to the survival of certain types of claims "based
upon the argument that justice does not require a windfall to the plaintiff's heirs," asserting that the
proper inquiry instead is "why a fortuitous event such as death should extinguish a valid action."
Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 445 n.9 (Pa. 1975) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF
ToRTs § 126, at 901 (4th ed. 1971)); see also Canino v. New York News, 475 A.2d 528, 530 (N.J.
1984) (also quoting PROSSER); cf Kuehn v. Children's Hosp., 119 F.3d 1296, 1303 (7th Cir. 1997)
(describing the windfall argument as "too powerful" because "it implies that all... suits should
abate with the death of the victim, not just suits seeking damages for pain and suffering").
417. The Robertson Court concluded that "the fact that a particular action might abate surely
would not adversely affect § 1983's role in preventing official illegality ..."Robertson, 436 U.S.
at 592. That analysis would seem to be equally applicable to the abatement of a particular remedy,
because a state statutory limitation on damages is less restrictive than a state statutory requirement
that the entire action abate. See Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 665 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
But see Haluch, supra note 102, at 763 ("Congress enacted specific remedies to redress the discrimination done to ADA plaintiffs, and the removal of one or more remedies is as problematic as
complete abatement of an ADA claim."). See generally Morse, supra note 108, at 25 ("That [a"
state survival statute] may not furnish.., a remedy in a particular instance simply cannot be
deemed inconsistent with section 1983 ....).
418. See Robertson, 436 U.S. at 593; see also Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp.
282, 295 (D. Colo. 1982); cf.Weeks v. Benton, 649 F. Supp. 1297, 1305 (S.D. Ala. 1986) ("[T]he
policy of deterrence of official misconduct was not seriously undermined by the abatement of [the]
particular action [in Robertson].") (emphasis added).
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restricts the policies underlying federal law.419 A survival statute that
does not preclude the recovery of all damages, 420 but only
422 those for pain
and suffering,4 '" may not satisfy this rigorous standard.

IV. THE SURVIVAL OF PAIN AND SUFFERING CLAIMS IN ADEA CASES
This article has focused primarily upon Title VII and ADA cases
because damages for pain and suffering appear to be unavailable under
the ADEA,423 although the ADEA itself is actually silent on this question. 42 If such damages were recoverable, 42' however, the analysis in
419. See Sager, 543 F. Supp. at 295; cf. Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 77
(Wash. CL App. 1987) (indicating that the Robertson standard is satisfied where the state statute
"significantly restricts the type of actions that survive"). See generally Boykin, supra note 110, at
52 (observing that courts have rejected state statutory provisions that would "dramatically restrict"
the recovery available in federal civil rights actions in which the victim is deceased).
420. See, e.g., Gartin v. St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 749 P.2d 941, 945 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (observing that "survival statutes provide for recovery of damages sustained by the deceased
party... in the nature of hospital and medical expenses"); Amoroso v. Burdette Tomlin Mem'l
Hosp., 901 F. Supp. 900, 903 (D.N.J. 1995) (noting that Pennsylvania's survival statute "allows
recovery ... for loss based on the prospective earning capacity of the deceased").
421. See, e.g., Kynaston v. United States, 717 F.2d 506, 512 (10th Cir. 1983) (discussing a
survival statute that "provided for a possible full recovery, except pain and suffering"); Woolridge
v. Woolett, 638 P.2d 566, 568 (Wash. 1981) (discussing a survival statute that "preserve[d] the
causes of action that a person could have maintained had he not died, other than for pain and suffering").
422. See Kuehn v. Children's Hosp., 119 F.3d 1296, 1303 (7th Cir. 1997):
The objection to making a... suit abate with the death of the victim is that it gives
the injurer an incentive to make a clean kill and reduces the deterrent effect of [the] law
by eliminating any.., sanction for inflicting fatal injuries. The objection is diminished
when the rule of abatement is limited... to one item of damages.
See also Doore, supra note 19, at 393 ("Where some claims survive-even just one claim-the
question of inconsistency is less stark.") (discussing Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878
F. Supp. 1401 (D. Colo. 1994)); cf. Strickland, 735 P.2d at 77 (indicating that the Robertson standard is met "where state law does not provide survival of any tort actions").
423. For an academic discussion of this issue, see Richard M. Chisholm, Note, Compensatory
Damagesfor Pain and Suffering Held Recoverable Under the Age Discriminationin Employment
Act of 1967, 7 SEToNHALL L. REV. 642 (1976).
424. See Shinwari v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1324 (D. Kan. 1998)
(observing that "the ADEA is silent' with respect to whether plaintiffs can recover "compensatory
damages for pain and suffering"); Marchant v. Schenley Indus., 572 F. Supp. 155, 160 (M.D.
Tenn. 1983) ('The ADEA does not allow or preclude expressly damages for pain and suffering.").
One federal appellate court has stated that this silence is an indication that "pain and suffering
awards were not contemplated by the draftsmen." Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co.,
550 F.2d 834, 841 (3rd Cir. 1977); see also Marchant,572 F. Supp. at 160 ("[TMhe silence of the
ADEA on the subject of damages for pain and suffering... support[s] the conclusion that Congress intended to deny recovery for pain and suffering in an ADEA action.").
425. In some respects, differences between the ADEA and other federal employment discrimination laws, and in particular the ADEA's adoption of the FLSA remedial scheme, actually
make it "easier for plaintiffs to recover" in ADEA cases. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, 55
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ADEA cases would differ from that in other employment discrimination
cases,426 even though (like Title VII and the ADA) 27 the ADEA is also
silent with respect to whether claims arising thereunder survive the victim's death.4
The differing treatment of this issue stems from the fact that 42
U.S.C. § 1988,429 the federal statute authorizing resort to state survival
provisions in Title VII ° and ADA cases,43 only governs the survival of
civil rights claims,432 and the ADEA is not a civil rights statute within
the meaning of § 1988. 4" Absent a provision comparable to § 1988 in
F.3d 1276, 1280 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995); cf.Alan A. Blakeboro, Allocation ofProofin ADEA Cases:A
Critiquieof the Prima Facie CaseApproach, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 90, 101 (1980) ("The legislative
history of the two acts does not indicate any intent to grant less protection to the aged than to the
groups protected by Title VII. In fact, by incorporating the enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act into the ADEA, Congress has granted ADEA plaintiffs more protection ......
(footnotes omitted).
426. See Small v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 759 F. Supp. 1427, 1430 (W.D. Mo. 1991). For
an academic discussion of the survival of ADEA claims, see Haluch, supranote 102, at 750-52.
427. See generally Estwick v. U.S.Air Shuttle, 950 F. Supp. 493, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
("[T]he ADEA, ADA and Title VII are silent as to whether a cause of action survives a plaintiffs
death ....); Doore, supra note 19, at 384 ("Most of the federal civil rights statutes-such as section 1983, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), Title VII, and the ADA-are
silent on the issue of survival.") (footnotes omitted).
428. See Asklar v. Honeywell, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 419, 422 (D. Conn. 1982). The same is true of
the FLSA, the remedial provisions of which are incorporated into the ADEA. See id.
429. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1996).
430. See Slade ex rel. Estate of Slade v. United States Postal Serv., 952 F.2d 357, 360 (10th
Cir. 1991); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., 87 F.R.D. 26, 28 (N.D. Ga. 1980). But see Khan v. Grotnes
Metalforming Sys., 679 F. Supp. 751, 756 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (concluding that § 1988 is not applicable in Title VII cases). See generally Berger v. Iron Workers, C.A. No. 75-1743 (TJP/PJA), 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14655, at *6 & n.3 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1990) (observing that there is a "difference
of opinion in the several circuits" on the issue of "whether the survival of a Title VII cause of action is governed by state law or federal common law").
431. See Rosenblum v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 878 F. Supp. 1404, 1408-09 (D. Colo.
1994); cf. Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1997) (observing that
"state law governs the survival of... ADA claim[s]"). But see Estwick v. U.S.Air Shuttle, 950 F.
Supp. 493, 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (implicitly extending Khan to ADA claims); Doore, supra note
19, at 389 (exploring the question of whether the ADA is "among the provisions.., to which 42
U.S.C. § 1988 is to be applied"). See generally Booth, supra note 102, at 269 ("When federal
statutes are silent regarding claim survival, courts possess the discretion to utilize either state law
or federal common law, whichever better serves the federal statute's intent.").
432. See Asklar, 95 F.R.D. at 422 n.2; see also Hutchinson, 126 F.3d at 898 (observing that
"state law governs the survival of statutory civil rights actions"); Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown
Fin. Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 414 n.17 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he reference to state law under 42 U.S.C. §
1988 is not applicable in non-civil rights actions."); Oliver v. United States Army, 758 F. Supp.
484, 485 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (stating that "§ 1988 requires courts to apply state law to questions of
survival of federal civil rights actions").
433. See Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Glanz v.
Vernick, 750 F. Supp. 39, 43 (D. Mass. 1990) (observing that the ADEA is not "enforced under a
civil rights regime"). But cf. Doore, supra note 19, at 384 (characterizing the ADEA as a "federal
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the ADEA,4M the courts typically look to federal common law, rather
than to state survival law, in assessing the survival of a decedent's
claims. 435 In Small v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,436 for example, the court stated:
[T]he rationale used to find that a claim under the ADEA survives the
death of a party significantly differs from the rationale used to find that
a federal civil rights claim survives.... [Tjhe survival of civil rights
claims is governed by state law. Conversely, federal common
4 law determines whether a claim brought under the ADEA survives. 11
As a matter of federal common law, claims for pain and suffering
generally survive the death of the injured party.4 3' Thus, to the extent
such damages were recoverable in an ADEA action,4 9 the right to recover them presumably would survive the death of the particular age
discrimination victim entitled to them, 4' as is also true of most other
civil rights statute").
434. See Khan, 679 F. Supp. at 756 (noting that the ADEA "do[es] not contain a provision
similar to 42 U.S.C. § 1988"). But cf. Jardien v. Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1159 n.10
(7th Cir. 1989) (stating that "precedents under § 1988 are relevant to ADEA proceedings").
435. See Glanz, 950 F. Supp. at 42 (observing that "cases considering whether an action
brought under the [ADEA] abates with the death of the plaintiff have uniformly applied federal
law"); Khan, 679 F. Supp. at 756 (observing that "the state law principles which govern survival of
federal civil rights actions ...are not applicable" in ADEA cases). See generally Smith v. Department of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 832, 834 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The question of the survival of an
action grounded in federal law is governed by federal common law when... there is no expression
of contrary intent.").
436. 759 F. Supp. 1427 (W.D. Mo. 1991).
437. Id. at 1430 (citation omitted); see also Doore, supra note 19, at 384 n.104 ("The ADEA,
while silent on the issue of survival, may not actually present the same problem. This is because
federal common law, rather than 42 U.S.C. § 1988, has been applied to determine survival, and the
result has usually been survival of the claims.").
438. See, e.g., Park v. Korean Air Lines Co., No. 83-CIV-7900 (PNL), 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16841, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1992) ("[W]e find overwhelming evidence that the federal common law of torts provides for a survival action that includes recovery for pre-death pain and suffering.") (citing the "comprehensive review" of this issue in In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ospina v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992)); Booth, supra note 102, at 285 (observing that
"the federal common law ... would allow damages for pain and suffering as a recovery which is
remedial in nature").
439. See Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1294 (4th Cir. 1979) ("Several district courts... have interpreted the ADEA... to permit an award of damages for pain and suffer-

ing."); Flynn v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 463 F. Supp. 676, 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("A number
of district courts have awarded compensatory damages for pain and suffering ....).
440. In Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry,769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985), for example, the court
observed that "Congress intended to preclude any award of general damages for pain and suffering
under the ADEA", Id. at 964 n.7, but also noted that "there is no reason to suppose that a monetary
claim... would not survive death", Id. at 964 n.8; see also Hawes v. Johnson &Johnson, Inc., 940
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ADEA remedies."

However, there is some basis for reaching a contrary conclusion!

2

ADEA claims typically survive the victim's death because they are
deemed to be remedial in nature.443 Claims that are penal, by contrast,

generally do not survive under the federal common law applicable in
ADEA cases.4
In this regard, it has been argued that "pain and suffering damages
awarded after the victim's death are not compensatory because the person whom the damages would compensate is unable to receive the
benefit of the compensation." ' In other words, because the ADEA's

compensatory purpose 4" cannot be fulfilled by an award for a decedent's pain and suffering,447 pain and suffering damages awarded after
the victim's death might properly be considered penal, rather than remedial, in nature."'

F. Supp. 697, 703 (D.N.J. 1996) ("I find that plaintiffs claims for compensatory damages in the
nature of emotional injuries under the ADEA survived his death.") (citing Kahn, 679 F. Supp. at
756).
441. See Fariss,769 F.2d at 962 n.3 ("It is clear that an ADEA claim survives the death of the
original plaintiff and is subject to revival by his legal representative as a matter of federal law.").
ADEA claims for liquidated damages are the exception. See infra notes 449-53 and accompanying
text.
442. Interestingly, courts have occasionally looked to state law in assessing the survival of the
FLSA remedies that are incorporated into the ADEA. See, e.g., Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription
Pharmacies, 465 F. Supp. 936, 950-51 (D. Colo. 1979); cf. Southern Package Corp. v. Walton, 18
So. 2d 458,459-60 (Miss. 1944) (using state law to justify damages provided under the FLSA).
443. See Smith v. Department of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 832, 837 (10th Cir. 1989)
(observing that "claims for reinstatement, backpay, and other benefits under the ADEA are clearly
remedial in nature"); see aslo Hawes, 940 F. Supp. at 703 (referring to the "generally remedial
nature of the ADEA"); Khan v. Grotnes Metalforming Sys., 679 F. Supp. 751,756 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(describing the ADEA as "remedial in nature").
444. See Smith, 876 F.2d at 834-35 ("The general rule under the federal common law is that
an action for a penalty does not survive the death of the plaintiff."); Khan, 679 F. Supp. at 756
("Federal common law has long recognized that actions which are penal in nature do not survive
the death of a party.").
445. Denton v. Superior Court, 945 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Ariz. 1997); cf. Brown v. Morgan
County, 518 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ala. 1981) ("It is clear that where the injured party is deceased, any damage award would not compensate him for his injuries, because the cruel fact is that
he is no longer present to benefit from any damages award.").
446. See Asklar v. Honeywell, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 419, 423 (D. Conn. 1982) (observing that the
ADEA's "primary purpose is to compensate"); see also Khan, 679 F. Supp. at 756 (quoting Ask-

lar).
447. See Garcia v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580, 586 (Ct. App. 1986); see also Culver-Union Township Ambulance Serv. v. Steindler, 611 N.E.2d 698,705 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
448. See Denton, 945 P.2d at 1287 (discussing the contention that "because damages for pain
and suffering paid after the victim's death are non-compensatory, they are, in effect, quasipunitive"); Holiday v. Pacific Ad. S.S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729, 736 (D. Del. 1953) (suggesting that
"pain and suffering sustained by the deceased... might be considered in the nature of exemplary
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Indeed, the closest analogue to a pain and suffering award in
ADEA cases appears to be an award of liquidated damages. 9 The Supreme Court has characterized liquidated damages as "punitive in nature, '450 and several courts have likewise concluded that, for survival
purposes, they are to be considered penal in nature.45' Thus, if pain and
suffering damages were recoverable under the ADEA, they-like liqui-

dated damages under that act 452-might not survive the victim's death.
V. CONCLUSION

Because no federal employment discrimination law addresses the
impact of a victim's death, courts have typically looked to state survival
law in analyzing that issue. When the applicable state survival statute
precludes recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering, courts have
applied the statute only to the extent it was not deemed to be inconsistent with federal employment discrimination policies.
In analyzing this question, the prevailing view is that state survival

or punitive damages").
449. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1982) (concluding
that "damages for pain and suffering are not available under the ADEA" in part because liquidated
damages may be awarded to "compensate the aggrieved party for [such] nonpecuniary losses")
(quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 950, at 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 528, 535);
Bonura v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 629 F. Supp. 353, 366 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (suggesting that an
award of liquidated damages under the ADEA may compensate for "such intangible losses as...
emotional distress"); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 314, 322
(N.D. Ill. 1982) ("mhe liquidated damages available under the ADEA upon a showing of willful
discrimination can be viewed as serving the function of damages for emotional pain and suffering
generally available in the compensatory framework of common law torts."). But cf. Schmitz v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 1994) (Trott, J., concurring) ("Under the law of this circuit, ADEA liquidated damages do not compensate for... emotional distress, or pain and suffering.").
450. Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125-26 (1985).
451. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Human Servs., 876 F.2d 832, 836 (10th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that "an action solely for liquidated damages under the ADEA is penal"); Hawes v.
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 697, 703 (D.N.J. 1996) (stating that liquidated damages
"are penal in nature under the ADEA").
452. See, e.g., Smith, 876 F.2d at 837 (stating that "a suit for liquidated damages under the
ADEA[] does not survive [the victim's] death"); Hawes, 940 F. Supp. at 703 (holding that
"plaintiff's claims for liquidated and punitive damages.., under the ADEA did not survive his
death"); Duart v. FMC Wyo. Corp., 859 F. Supp. 1447, 1451 n.2 (D. Wyo. 1994) (holding that an
ADEA action "survives the death of the plaintiff, but that claims for liquidated damages will not
survive his death"), ajfld, 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995).
453. See Layne v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 418 F. Supp. 964, 965-66 (D.S.C.
1976) (applying federal common law to preclude recovery for a decedent's pain and suffering). But
cf. Hawes, 940 F. Supp. at 703 (characterizing ADEA claims for emotional distress as
"compensatory," and holding that they survive the victim's death).
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statutes precluding recovery for pain and suffering are not inconsistent
with federal compensatory objectives. On the other hand, such a statute
may impede federal deterrent objectives, at least in cases where the discrimination victim was elderly or infirm, or where the employer's discriminatory conduct itself caused or contributed to the victim's death.
However, there is also support for the contrary view that, even under
those circumstances, the preclusion of a particular remedy such as damages for the victim's pain and suffering is simply not a sufficient impediment to deterrence to warrant a refusal to apply a state survival
statute in federal employment discrimination litigation.
However, this analysis does not apply in all employment discrimination cases. Because damages for the victim's pain and suffering are
generally unavailable under the ADEA, the impact of state survival
statutes precluding such recovery is an academic question in most age
discrimination cases. In the event futute Congressional action authorizes
recovery for pain and suffering in ADEA cases, however, courts presumably will look to federal common law, rather than to state statututory law, in determining whether that remedy survives the victim's
death. And in applying federal law, the courts are likely to conclude that
damages for pain and suffering do survive because they are remedial,
rather than penal, in nature.
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